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ABSTRACT
Predicting Inflation and the Relationship between Financial Integration, Financial
Development and Economic Growth

Lillian T. Kamal
Three essays are presented. The first essay re-visits the P* model (developed by Hallman, Porter
and Small, 1991) with an application to US data. The central idea behind the P* model is that the
price level is determined by the money stock, output and velocity. This study brings together
criticisms of the P* model together in an attempt to address the major concerns with an
improvement upon the existing model. A horse race is then run between the original P* model,
two variant P* models, and three other models – an atheoretic naïve AR process and an ARMA
process as well as a standard output gap type model (the Phillips curve approach). The results
show that the P* approach modeled using a Hodrick Prescott filter marginally out-performs all the
other models of inflation in terms of forecast accuracy, suggesting that it may be more useful for
inflation-targeting purposes. The results indicate that models based on past information cannot
outperform the more sophisticated P*-type models. The second essay looks at the relationship
between financial development and growth from a developing country perspective, while
controlling for financial repression. The proxy of choice is the ratio of currency outside the
banking system (CB) to real output. The empirical results show that CB relates negatively to
growth in countries that are less financially liberalized and positively with growth in countries that
are more financially liberalized. An innovative measure of financial repression is then proposed
that combines the use of currency inside banks and currency outside banks, and is tested
concurrently with a broad money depth measure. The study concludes that there is overwhelming
evidence that financial repression, which is indicative of financial under-development is
negatively related to growth. The final essay implements an innovative approach that examines
the impact of financial integration on financial development, and subsequently on economic
growth within a sample of EU countries. The study looks at bank-based measures of financial
development in an effort to establish whether a relationship exists between financial development
and growth in the European Union countries, and if so, whether this relationship has been affected
by financial integration. The results support the hypothesis that the benefits of economic and
financial integration are not uniform.

iii

Dedication
This dissertation is dedicated to my parents, and family, without whose love, support and
encouragement, I could never have made it this far. Thank you always – you are my
strength.

Acknowledgements
I would like to thank the following people, without whom this work would not have been
possible. To my parents, Kamru and Ranu, and my brother and sister, Sameer and Susie,
for their endless love, support and encouragement, and for giving me the opportunity to
pursue this degree. Professor Ron Balvers, who has had endless patience with me in the
completion of this project, and who has provided me with invaluable support and
guidance throughout this process. I could not have had a better dissertation supervisor,
professor and mentor. Professors Abbott, Basistha, Egorov and Kymn – many thanks for
being such a wonderful committee and for all your excellent comments and guidance. To
Professor Hassan Arvin-Rad at Northwestern University, who gave me many useful
econometric comments. Christine Harrington, for many valuable comments, and for
being such a good friend. And last, but certainly not least, John Hagen, for patiently
answering all my endless questions on preparing this manuscript for ETD submission,
and for being the best friend anybody could ask for. Go Mountaineers!

iv

Table of Contents

Chapter 1
On Refining the Traditional P* Model of Inflation Forecasting

Page 1

Theory

Page 3

Data and Methodology

Page 8

Results

Page 10

Robustness tests

Page 15

Conclusion

Page 21

Appendix 1

Page 24

Appendix 2

Page 25

Appendix 3

Page 26

Chapter 2
Re-examining the Relationship Between Financial Development
and Growth – A Developing Country Perspective

Page28

Theory

Page 29

Methodology

Page 35

Results

Page 41

Robustness tests

Page 43

Conclusion

Page 46

Appendix 1

Page 50

Appendix 2

Page 52

Appendix 3

Page 61

Chapter 3
The effect of Financial Integration on Financial Development
and Growth: A Case Study of the European Union

Page 62

Historical Review

Page 63

v

Theory

Page 64

Methodology

Page 69

Results

Page 75

Robustness tests

Page 84

Conclusion

Page 85

Appendix 1

Page 89

Appendix 2

Page 91

Appendix 3

Page 93

Appendix 4

Page 94

1

Chapter 1

On Refining the Traditional P* Model of Inflation Forecasting

This paper re-visits the P* model (developed by Hallman, Porter and Small, 1991) with an
application to US GDP and M2 data from 1959 to 2003. The central idea behind the P* model is
that the price level is determined by the money stock, output and velocity. This paper brings
together criticisms of the P* model together in an attempt to address the major concerns with an
improvement upon the existing model. To this end, two variants of the classic P* approach are
tested. The first approach departs from the traditional approach of using potential GDP as the
measure of equilibrium velocity and instead models equilibrium GDP with a constant and a trend,
thus redefining the output gap. Equilibrium velocity is also modeled in this way, and the new output
and velocity gaps are used to redefine P*. The second approach uses a Hodrick-Prescott filter to
extract the mean of velocity and of output, and uses this smoothing mechanism to construct new
velocity and output gaps. A horse race is then run between the original P* model, the two variant P*
models, and three other models – an atheoretic naïve AR process and an ARMA process as well as a
standard output gap type model (the Phillips curve approach). Inflation is forecasted in both levels
and differences. The Hodrick-Prescott price gap has twice the explanatory power of the original
price gap suggesting that it better captures the effects of money on inflation. Furthermore, the
results show that the P* approach modeled using a Hodrick Prescott filter marginally out-performs
all the other models of inflation in terms of forecast accuracy, suggesting that it may be more useful
for inflation-targeting purposes. Overall the results indicate that models based on past information
cannot outperform the more sophisticated P*-type models.

JEL Classification: E30, E31, E37, E52

Policy-makers must always keep their eye on macroeconomic variables for the purposes
of designing and sequencing policy measures. Economic studies have thus spent a fair amount of
time understanding the forces behind changes in the macro-economy, and forecasting
macroeconomic variables such as output, employment and inflation. A section of the forecasting
literature has dealt with understanding the behaviour of and predicting inflation.
Lillian Kamal, Department of Economics, West Virginia University, P.O. Box 6025, Morgantown, WV
26506. E-mail: ltkamal@mail.wvu.edu
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Accurate forecasting is important when it comes to inflation targeting. It has been suggested
that since inflation responds to monetary policy with a lag of about one-two years (Bernanke and
Woodford, 1997), monetary authorities would be better off targeting forecasts of inflation rather
than the inflation rate itself. If this is an important strategy, then it is all the more important to
accurately forecast inflation.
Past papers have emphasized the role of Phillips-curve type models (output gap models) in
predicting inflation. In general, Phillips curve type models argue that inflation can be explained
by lags of inflation and information contained in an output gap (reflecting the gap between
current unemployment and the natural rate of unemployment). When the output gap is positive,
inflation accelerates and the central monetary authority’s usual response is to increase the interest
rate (Razzak, 2002). Higher interest rates serve to slow the economy down, and output returns to
the full employment level, this eliminating the output gap and reducing inflation.
Output gap models hinge on estimating the output gap correctly as the measure of full
employment is always subject to discussion. There is always concern that incorrectly estimating
the output gap would lead to unnecessary tightening and loosening of monetary policy (Razzak,
2002). This viewpoint is also shared by Orphanides (1998), who observes that “if policy-makers
mistakenly adopt policies that are optimal under the presumption that their understanding of the
state of the economy is accurate when, in fact, such accuracy is lacking, they inadvertently induce
instability in both inflation and economic activity”.
A portion of the inflation forecasting literature has concentrated on the link between money
and prices. This paper focuses on one such link – the P* approach. The P* relationship relies on
two fundamentals: the quantity theory of money and the lagged adjustment of prices. P* is
basically defined as that equilibrium price level that is consistent with current money supply and
equilibrium in the goods and financial markets.
The P* model was developed by Hallman, Porter and Small (1991) – henceforth referred to in
this paper as HPS. The model arose out of an attempt to find the link between M2 and prices in
the long run and also to solve the problem of which monetary aggregate to target to design
effective monetary policy. The unique quality of this model is its emphasis on deviations of
money velocity from “equilibrium” values as important in the determination of the level of prices.
The P* approach is derived from the quantity theory of money. The basic idea is that there is
an optimal price level (P*) that is derived from the equilibrium values of velocity (V*) and output
(Y*) in the economy. The P* model assumes that output in the economy follows a smooth
deterministic trend. The measure of equilibrium output Y*, is assumed not to be affected by
monetary policy. Money is therefore neutral in the long run. The original P* model also assumes
that V* is constant. To this end V* is taken to be the mean or average value of velocity over a
sample while the equilibrium measure of output growth in the economy is the potential GDP
measure. Based on V* and Y*, and actual money growth an equilibrium price level P* is
developed (as explained in section 2). V* and Y* are expected to return to their equilibrium
values over time and this in turn drives P back to P*. Ultimately the main difference between the
P*-type models and other inflation models such as the output gap models is the introduction of
the velocity gap.
Policy recommendations then depend on the relationship of P* to the actual price level.
Needless to say the direction and magnitude of the difference between P and P* is very important
for policy formulation. The usefulness of the P* model is only highlighted if it provides
information that is not provided by other inflation models (Christiano, 1990).
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: section 2 presents the theoretical
formulation for the traditional P* model, discusses further studies on the P* model and considers
some criticisms of the traditional P* model. This section also introduces other models that are
tested against the HPS approach, and discusses adjustments to the classic model. Overall the
paper tests four other models – these are a benchmark ARMA process, a simple Phillips-curve
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model, and two re-defined P*-type models. Section 3 presents data and methodology. Section 4
discusses in-sample results for all the models, and also presents the out-of-sample forecasting
performance of each of the above models. Section 5 presents robustness results and section 6
concludes.

1. Theory
1. I. The P* Model According to HPS
As mentioned, the basis of the P* model lies in the quantity theory of money and the equation of
exchange. The equation of exchange forms the root of the model:
MV = PY

(1)

Where M = M2 (broad money stock); V = Velocity; P = GDP deflator, and Y = output in the
economy at constant prices. The second step involves solving for the price level in the aggregate
economy:
P = M(V/Y)

(2)

Thereafter two key assumptions are made. Velocity and output are assumed to be mean reverting
over time (that is they display cyclical behaviour). Output is assumed to revert to a measure of
potential output over time. Potential output theoretically refers to the full employment level of
national real output. The equilibrium values for velocity (for velocity this is taken to be the
sample-mean) and output are entered into the equation of exchange and the equilibrium price
level is solved for, resulting in equation (3) below.
Assumptions: V and Y will return to the equilibrium values V*, and Y* over time.
P* = M(V*/Y*)

(3)

P* is the level of prices that is proportional to the money stock per unit of potential output. The
next step involves taking natural logs of equations (2) and (3) – this gives us equations 2’ and 3’
below.
lnP = lnM + lnV – lnY

(2’)

lnP* = lnM + lnV* - lnY*

(3’)

Equation 4 below then solves explicitly for the price gap (done by subtracting equation 3’ from
2’).
(lnP-lnP*) = (lnV-lnV*) + (lnY*-lnY)

(4)

To conserve on notation, equation (4) above is reduced to the form below:
(p-p*) = (v-v*) + (y*-y)

(4’)

Equation 4’ carries an important implication - the only way that P can differ from P* is if V
differs from V* or if Y differs from Y*. Equation (4’) thus highlights the fact that the deviations
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of price from its equilibrium value can be measured by the summation of a velocity gap and an
output gap. At this point, HPS refer to the work of Mussa (1981) and McCallum (1980) who
present inflation adjustment equations that model current inflation as dependent on forwardlooking information. Mussa’s equation is equation (5) below:
_

_

π t = α[ pt − p t ] + π t ;α > 0

(5)
_

_

Where π t is an estimate of the expected growth in the equilibrium price level p . In Mussa’s
model, the equilibrium price level is the price level when the money market is in equilibrium,
although the variables that affect money demand are not expected to be in equilibrium.
McCallum’s equation is equation (6) below; again, inflation responds to the gap between actual
and equilibrium price levels. McCallum’s equilibrium price level is also forward looking – it
represents the equilibrium price level that would occur if the economy were performing at
capacity, given current aggregate demand. The main difference between Mussa’s and
McCallum’s equilibrium price levels and HPS p* is that the former do not incorporate deviations
in velocity.
~

~

~

π t = α [ pt −1 − p t −1 ] + Ε t −1 [ p t − p t −1 ];α > 0

(6)

HPS incorporate all forward-looking information into p* itself, and include only backward
looking information instead of the second term used by Mussa and McCallum. They propose a
simple ad hoc formulation that uses the previous period’s inflation measure as the best estimation
of lagged information over their sample period (1955-1988).
HPS then present their versions of equations 5 and 6 above in the form of equation 5’ below.

π t = α [ pt −1 − p *t −1 ] + π t −1 ; α > 0

(5’)

∆π t = α [ pt −1 − p *t −1 ] ; α > 0

(6’)

Equation 6’ simply has the last lag of inflation moved to the left hand side of equation 5’, and
thus shows that accelerations of inflation are also related to the price gap. HPS include the
possibility that further lags of inflation can be included – they extend the model to include four
lags of the accelerations in inflation. In generalized form then, HPS then present the P* model as
a function of a price gap and the sum of lagged changes in inflation:
∆π t = α (p-p*) t −1 + β 1 ∆π t −1 + β 2 ∆π t − 2 + β 3 ∆π t −3 + β 4 ∆π t − 4

(7)

Overall, it is vital to note that the validity of the money-supply driven models of the price level
depend on two key assumptions: that there is an identifiable trend in the velocity of money and
that money is in fact, neutral in the long run. Potential output is therefore not affected by money
supply changes.
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1. II) Further Work on the P* Model
The P* approach is based on a long-run view of the equation of exchange. HPS have shown
that the model has proven explanatory power over the 2-3 year forecasting horizon. However, it
has received a fair amount of criticism over the years. The basic model assumes that velocity is
mean reverting, and thus returns to its equilibrium value over time. Pecchenino and Rasche
(1990) have discussed the idea that neither velocity nor output is in fact, mean reverting. This
criticism loses its significance, however, when one considers that velocity and output do not enter
the P* model directly – they do so in terms of gaps. Hoeller and Poret (1991) have shown that if
a linear combination of two non-stationary gaps is stationary, then the non-stationary gaps can
enter a regression as right hand side variables. For econometric stability then it need only be
necessary for the price gaps to be stationary and not the individual component deviations of
velocity and output from equilibrium values.
The basic P* model forecasts inflation in accelerations of the inflation rate. Ebrill and Fries
(1991) have suggested that it is more appropriate to predict inflation in levels rather than
differences. They find that the equation specified in levels has a better fit. The original P* model
regresses changes in the inflation rate on current inflation – in effect a change in the inflation rate
is a difference of a difference and can lead to serial correlation. This paper cannot confirm this
finding. When a model in differences is run against a model in levels, there is no evidence of
serial correlation (as evidenced by the Durbin-Watson statistic).1
A criticism of the model offered by Christiano (1989) is that the introduction of Super NOW
(Negotiable Order of Withdrawal) accounts has led to a permanent downward shift in M2
velocity (with NOW-type accounts, a minimum balance is required to earn a higher interest rate –
this restricts expenditure from an account of this type). Hallman and Anderson (1993) tested for
this hypothesis, however, and were able to reject the hypothesis of a shift in M2 velocity. Related
to this concern, is Orphanides and Porter’s (2000) criticism of the modeling of equilibrium
velocity as a constant. A constant V* does not allow for shifts or changes, and may cause an
unnecessary increase in the magnitude of the velocity gap.
A key issue that then arises with the P* models is the identification of the Y* process, and
the V* process. Past studies have used the notion of deterministic trends to identify these
processes. Christiano (1989) used a linear time trend to calculate equilibrium output. Hoeller
and Poret (1991) test two alternative specifications of this process (in a group of OECD
countries) – one of these is a linear process, and the other utilizes a filter method that extracts the
low frequency component of real GDP. However, it has been suggested by time series analysis
that real GDP may follow a stochastic rather than deterministic trend. The identification of
stochastic trends in a process can be done using two approaches. The first approach would be the
use of a structural approach. Ebrill and Fries (1990) and Pecchenino and Rasche (1990) use
measures based on a combination of the natural rate of unemployment and Okun’s Law to
identify potential output. HPS (1990) use the fitted values of a cointegration approach – they
regress velocity on a measures of the labour force employed in agriculture. They use this labour
variable as a proxy for the industrialization and monetization of the US (Hoeller and Poret, 1991).
However, the use of structural approaches may yield non-stationary price gaps, which would then
violate the assumptions of the P* model.
The second approach to identity potential output and equilibrium velocity is the use of filters,
which serve to extract the stochastic trends from the series. Bomhoff (1990) used a Kalman filter
to identify velocity in OECD countries. Hoeller and Poret (1991) use of a Hodrick-Prescott filter
1

The DW statistic is 1.98 for a model in differences and 1.97 for a model in levels. The finding of no
evidence of any serial correlation is subject to debate as it has been suggested that the DW statistic loses its
significance somewhat when lagged dependent variables are included on the RHS.
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to extract the equilibrium value of output. The main advantage that the Hodrick-Prescott filter
has over the Kalman filter is its computational ease. The smoothing parameter is chosen based on
split of the series into a “transitory” component and a “permanent” component. A very large
smoothing factor would indicate that most of the series is an almost constant trend. This indicates
that most of the shocks are transitory. On the other hand, a very small smoothing factor would
indicate that most of the shocks are, in fact, permanent, that is they are reflective of changes in
trend. (Hoeller and Poret, 1991.) The exact choice of the smoothing factor then becomes critical.
As mentioned, Orphanides and Porter (2000) experimented with using a time trend in
identifying equilibrium velocity and they find that while significant, a time trend has a very small
positive effect on equilibrium velocity. Including a time trend alone cannot then explain the
apparent upward shift in velocity over the last 15 years. They therefore include a dummy
variable for a shift in velocity. Hoeller and Poret’s filter technique then becomes more attractive
because the complications of including a dummy for an unknown shift date in velocity are
removed. The use of a filter allows the smooth extraction of equilibrium velocity that has already
endogenized minor breaks in the data.
Tatom (1990) cites two flaws with the P* model – the assumptions of stationarity of M2
velocity and of the price gap, and the lack of an MA error process in any autoregressive
specification of current inflation. Tatom also suggests that the P* approach with M2 velocity
may have specification errors and thus models a P* model using M1 velocity. He finds that the
M1 P* approach finds a significant relationship between M1 and prices. It is important to note,
however, that the introduction of innovations such as Super-NOW accounts will have increased
M1 velocity and thus will over-identify the velocity gap. M2 velocity on the other hand will not
be affected by such innovations.
Hoeller and Poret (1991) have found that the P* model works better in larger rather than
smaller countries. Kool and Tatom (1994) test to see whether differences in the prevailing
exchange rate systems are an explanation for this dichotomy. The original P* approach models
prices as a function of the money supply. Under fixed exchange rate systems, however, the price
level is determined abroad and money supply is exogenously determined. Money supply under
fixed exchange rate schemes then becomes demand-determined. Kool and Tatom therefore
develop a generalized P* approach that accounts for an international effect by including crosscountry gaps. They find that the P* model holds for both flexible and fixed-exchange rate system
countries although in countries with fixed exchange rate schemes, the equilibrium price level is
determined by foreign monetary policy.
Fleissig and Fisher (1995) make the assumption that the P* model is in fact, correct, and
thereafter work on searching for the best monetary aggregate that fits the model. They disagree
with the use of simple sum aggregates. Simple sum aggregates do not account for the imperfect
substitutability between the components of the aggregates. For example, with reference to M2,
cash and money market mutual funds are imperfect substitutes. Fleissig and Fisher use divisia
aggregates that better account for the different rates of return on each of the components of the
aggregates. They find that the use of divisia-type aggregates improves the explanatory power of
the P* model.
As is evident from the above discussion, a significant amount of work has been done with P*
type models. While some studies have found support for the models, an equal number of studies
have suggested modifications that are expected to increase their explanatory power. The
following section adopts some of the modifications in an attempt to improve upon the original
HPS model.
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1. III) Adjustments to the Model
This section attempts to address some of the concerns raised in the literature about the
formulation of the original P* model. One of the first criticisms that is addressed is the HPS use
of a constant equilibrium value. Following HPS, assumptions are made that velocity and output
are mean reverting. However, the equilibrium values of velocity and output are modeled as timevariant. The simplest model of such a process would reflect a constant and a time trend. These
processes are therefore modeled as follows:

v *t = α + bt

(8’)

y *t = φ + γ t

(8’’)

where t is a time trend. Equations 8’ and 8’’ are then nested into the velocity and output gaps.
Including a linear time trend2 in the equation for equilibrium velocity allows v* to vary over
time – this then allows equilibrium velocity to change over time. From the above process for
equilibrium velocity, the velocity gap; (v-v*), can then be derived. Equilibrium output is also
modeled in this way to allow for a constant growth rate. The output gap; (y*-y), can then be
derived as being positive during downturns in the economy (contractions in the business cycle),
and negative during growth periods in economic activity (expansions).
HPS have differenced inflation rates – the acceleration of past inflation – as RHS
variables to deal with stationarity issues. A drawback of differencing the data as HPS have done
is that there is a loss of long-run information - “differencing eliminates all info on the long run
properties of the model”3. One solution is to run the model in a levels4 form, while another
solution is to run a vector error correction model. This paper runs the equations in both levels
and differenced forms. Constant terms are also included in both the levels and differenced
equation forms.
π t = δ + β 1 (p-p*) t −1 + β 2 π t −1 + β 3 π t − 2 + β 4 π t −3 + β 5 π t − 4 + µ t

(8)

where (p-p*) t −1 = ( v-v*) t −1 + (y*-y) t −1

1. IV) Models Based on Past Information
The basic approach to forecasting a series would be to use only past information. Studies
have compared the P* type models with AR-type models. Hoeller and Poret (1991) compare the
P* approach with a standard second order autoregressive model. In this paper, the benchmark
models are two-fold – an AR(4) approach and a simple ARMA (4,4)5 approach – adopting the
2

Non-linear time trends are tested and found to be insignificant.
See Maddala, Page 262.
4
As mentioned earlier, Ebrill and Fries have shown that modeling inflation in levels is the more
appropriate specification.
5
This model is chosen based on both the minimum AIC and SBC criteria.
3
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MA terms is necessary to remove serial correlation. By modeling inflation using an ARMA
process, Tatom’s (1990) concern about the lack of MA terms is addressed. Using this approach,
the current inflation rate is explained using four lags of inflation and four MA terms. Equation 9
and 10 below presents the models based on past information alone.

π t = δ + α 1 π t −1 + α 2π t − 2 + α 3π t − 3 + α 4π t − 4 + µ t

(9)

π t = δ + α 1 π t −1 + α 2π t − 2 + α 3π t − 3 + α 4π t − 4 + γ 1ε t −1 + γ 2 ε t − 2 + γ 3ε t −3 + γ 4 ε t − 4

(10)

2. Data and Methodology
2. I) Methodology
The sample is split into an in-sample period from 1959:1-1989:4 and then an out-of-sample
period (for forecasting purposes) from 1990:1 2003:4. The data is from the Federal Reserve Bank
of St. Louis (FRED2).
Based on the discussion in section 2, the following six models are run:
1. A benchmark AR(4) model;
2. The benchmark ARMA (4,4) model;
3. HPS model with a constant equilibrium velocity (the traditional P*); (This model is
henceforth referred to as P*-HPS)
4. A redefined P*-type model where the equilibrium values of output and velocity are each
modeled on a constant and a time trend; (This model is henceforth referred to as P*BASIC)
5. A P* type model where equilibrium velocity and output are filtered out using a HodrickPrescott filter. (This model is henceforth referred to as P*-HOD)
6. A standard Phillips-curve type model with an output gap.
A standard Phillips-curve type model based on Lucas is used in this paper. This is the
most basic form of the Phillips curve type model, where the output gap is measured as a deviation
of output from the potential output level. The idea of potential output was first introduced by
Okun (1965) – it basically refers to that level of output that exists when the economy is producing
at the full employment level. In general, the Phillips curve represents the relationship between
the output gap (unemployment gap) and inflation (wage inflation). When the output gap is
positive, inflation accelerates, and monetary authorities respond by increasing the interest rate if
they wish to reduce inflation. A higher interest rate reduces demand for investment and
consumption and thus reduces inflation.
Following HPS, inflation is defined as: π t = 400/k*log(Pt/Pt-k) where k is the quarter
and P is the price level (the GDP deflator). The six models are run over the in-sample period and
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then a rolling forecast method is adopted over the out-of-sample period 1990:1 to 2003:4,
whereby the in-sample data set is increased by a quarter each time. Initially the forecasts are
performed for the k=1 horizon and k=4 horizons. For robustness purposes, in section 6, the
forecasting horizon is expanded to 12 quarters ahead.

2. II) Data and Statistics
Reflecting the concern that the price gaps may not be stationary over time, standard
Augmented Dickey-Fuller tests are performed. As mentioned a linear combination of two nonstationary variables may be stationary. Table 1 displays the results of unit root tests for the
different price gaps over the sample period. The augmented Dickey-Fuller tests show that the
basic price gap is clearly non-stationary, while the HPS price gap is stationary between the 5%
and 10% significance levels. The HOD gap is stationary at the 1% significance level. It is
important to note that, as mentioned earlier, the velocity gaps and the output gaps do not need to
be stationary if the price gap (which is a linear combination of the velocity gap and the output
gap) is stationary.

Table 1: Unit Root Tests on The Different Price Gaps
Type of Price Gap

ADF test statistic

P-P* (HPS)

-2.652987

P-P* (Basic)

-2.397577

P-P*(Hodrick-Prescott Filter)

-4.813505

** Critical Values are –3.4861 at the 1% significance level and –2.5795 at the 10% significance level.

Johansen’s cointegration test is then performed on the HPS price gap and the basic price gap.
The HPS and BASIC velocity gaps and output gaps show evidence of cointegration6.
All three types of velocity and output gaps are tested for structural breaks. The
methodology used follows the assumption that the break dates are unknown. The basic
methodology is as follows: Chow tests are performed for each possible break date by quarter.
The maximal F statistic is then compared with critical values generated through bootstrap
techniques7. This technique effectively endogenizes the break date. The F values are presented
in the Appendix in Table A1.

6
7

The cointegrating relationships are ygapbasic – 7.377177vgapbasic + 0.005430, and ygaphps – 3.890184vgaphps – 0.015666
For a detailed discussion, see Christiano (1988).
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3. Results
Table One presents in-sample results from the model based on past information, the three
P* type models, and the simple Phillips-Curve type model. The dependent and independent
inflation variables are all specified in terms of accelerations. The results above indicate that all
price gaps tested are significant in explaining inflation. The HOD gap has twice the explanatory
power of the HPS gap, and it is also the gap that is the most significant in explaining current
changes in inflation. The overall regression with the Hodrick-Prescott filter has an adjusted Rsquared of 0.23 which is marginally better than the HPS approach. While the AR and ARMA
approaches are appealing in their simplicity and their econometric sense, they have the lowest
adjusted R-squared values. It is interesting to note that the output gap in the Phillips-curve type
model has about the same explanatory power as the HPS price gap, indicating that the HPS price
gap is not capturing much more information than a simple output gap. This suggests that the HPS
gap is deficient in capturing the effect of changes in velocity on inflation; the result is more
obvious when compared with the Hodrick-Prescott gap that has double the explanatory power.

Table 1: Dependent Variable - Acceleration of Inflation
Sample period: 1959:1 1989:4
Model

AR(4)

Arma(4,4)

HPS P*

P* Basic

P* - HP filter

Phillips

δ

0.015651
(0.138073)

0.029025
(0.138969)

0.243659
(1.964409)
-14.11991
(-3.687117)

0.000858
(0.007841)
-9.764301
(-3.064566)

0.032649
(0.306634)
-28.526630
(-4.034140)

0.251681
(1.941815)

(p-p*) t −1

-0.448039
(-4.828072)
-0.321998
(-3.234107)
-0.194561
(-1.959280)
0.080643
(0.877224)

-0.418739
(-4.493912)
-0.286790
(-2.878390)
-0.158622
(-1.597602)
0.107666
(1.164454)

-0.460596
(-5.000793)
-0.337671
(-3.412464)
-0.213768
(-2.158692)
0.067837
(0.742900)

-14.46439
(-3.335855)
-0.438612
(-4.679568)
-0.317025
(-3.131078)
-0.194042
(-1.912645)
0.079023
(0.843058)

0.21

0.18

0.23

0.20

(y*-y) t −1
Π t −1
Π t −2
Π t −3
Π t −4

ε

t −1

ε

t −2

ε

t −3

ε

t −4

-0.338084
(-3.649262)
-0.190784
(-1.946159)
-0.065791
(-0.671324)
0.176816
(1.902570)

-0.744503
(-0.568910)
-0.369909
(-0.344978)
-0.318862
(-0.420008)
-0.024270
(-0.036852)
0.410236
(0.314239)
0.039694
(0.056684)
0.177702
(0.474420)
0.131580
(0.305962)
0.09

0.12
Adjusted
R-squared
t-statistics significant at the 5% level or less.
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Following Ebrill and Fries, the various models are also tested in terms of levels, where
the current inflation rate is predicted as opposed to the changes in the current inflation rate. The
dependent inflation specifications are in levels. These findings are presented in Table 3 below.
The results are similar – the Hodrick-Prescott filter gap has more than double the explanatory
power of the HPS gap, and the explanatory power of the HPS gap is approximately the same the
simple output gap tested in the Phillips-curve type model. An interesting vindication of the
Ebrill-Fries levels approach is the jump in adjusted R-squared values when the models are run in
levels terms.

Table 2: Dependent variable: level of inflation
Sample period: 1959:1 1989:4
Dependent variable: Inflation Rate: Independent variables are levels of inflation rate
Model

AR(4)

Arma(4,4)

HPS P*

Re-defined P*

P* - HP filter

δ

0.369540
(1.598738)

0.652576
(1.463616)

0.308548
(1.403088)
-14.68059
(-3.696414)*

0.522945
(2.370464)*
-12.17137
(-4.004955)*

0.322320
(1.499609)
-29.25946
(-4.378905)*

(p-p*) t −1
(y*-y)

Phillips
0.404675
(1.829496)
-14.70485
(-3.428551)*

t −1

(v-v*) t −1
π t −1
π

t −2

π t −3
π

t −4

ε

t −1

ε

t −2

ε

t −3

ε

t −4

Adjusted
R-squared

0.611103
(6.557607)*
0.114753
(1.051446)
0.087263
(0.799934)
0.108845
(1.176404)

0.324534
(0.833800)
0.341659
(0.924570)
-0.030543
(-0.081424)
0.222092
(0.645547)
0.305295
(0.789486)
-0.023549
(-0.061161)
0.186397
(0.601499)
0.166112
(0.986327)

0.533920
(5.877521)*
0.115806
(1.118471)
0.115219
(1.110361)
0.223382
(2.399753)*

0.509574
(5.588311)*
0.099213
(0.966477)
0.096102
(0.937060)
0.179022
(2.017999)

0.503581
(5.597726)*
0.102218
(1.008093)
0.103300
(1.018973)
0.225899
(2.510295)*

0.537997
(5.873404)*
0.107222
(1.027512)
0.106682
(1.021536)
0.215277
(2.296656)*

0.78

0.79

0.80

0.80

0.81

0.79

t-statistics significant at 5% level or less.

As has been shown earlier, the HOD price gap has greater explanatory power than the
HPS price gap, and the BASIC price gap. An interesting exercise is to test for the difference in
explanatory power of the various velocity and output gaps for the different models. The purpose
of this exercise is to identify whether it is indeed a money shock or a supply shock that has the
greater impact on future inflation. The equations are presented below as equations 10-12. Table
3 below separates the price gaps into velocity gaps and output gaps for all three price gap models.
The results are startling. The lagged velocity gaps using both the classic HPS approach
and the BASIC approach are insignificant in explaining current inflation. The implication is
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unmistakable – both these gaps are inadequate in capturing the link between money and inflation.
The HOD velocity gap on the other hand is highly significant in explaining current inflation. The
coefficient on the lagged velocity gap is as expected – it is negative indicating that if the velocity
gap were positive for example, inflation would decelerate as velocity reverted back to its
equilibrium value. The lagged output gaps in all the three models are similar in terms of
magnitude and significance, although the HOD output gap is most significant. Under all three P*
approaches, the output gaps are significant in explaining inflation. This would indicate the
dominance of a supply-side effect (the output gap is significant). A failure to compare the classic
P* approach with other variations of the price gap models would result in a conclusion base don
the dominance of supply gaps in explaining inflation, and a lesser role of money. The implication
is unmistakable - a greater role for money in explaining inflation exists only if the gap is
measured correctly.
π t =δ +

β 1 (v-v*) t −1 HPS + β 2 (y*-y) t −1 HPS + δ 1 π t −1 + δ 2 π t − 2 + δ 3 π t −3 + δ 4 π t − 4 + µ t

(11)

π t =δ +

β 1 (v-v*) t −1 BASIC + β 2

(12)

π t =δ +

β 1 (v-v*) t −1 HOD + β 2 (y*-y) t −1 HOD + δ 1 π t −1 + δ 2 π t − 2 + δ 3 π t −3 + δ 4 π t − 4 + µ t

(y*-y) t −1 BASIC +

δ 1 π t −1 + δ 2 π t − 2 + δ 3 π t −3 + δ 4 π t − 4 + µ t

(13)

Table 3: Dependent variable: levels of inflation
Dependent variable: Inflation rate
Model
HPS P*
0.2132
δ
(0.8407)
-13.3277
(y*-y) t −1
(-3.0567)*
-28.7542
(v-v*) t −1
(-1.5159)
0.5366
Π t −1
(5.8917)*
0.1247
Π t −2
(1.1946)
0.1216
Π t −3
(1.1662)
0.2215
Π t −4
(2.3745)*
Adjusted R0.80
squared

Re-defined P*
0.4596
(1.8228)
-11.3477
(-3.3090)*
-23.8274
(-1.0624)
0.5133
(5.5943)*
0.1066
(1.0255)
0.1012
(0.9792)
0.1767
(1.9835)
0.80

P* - HP filter
0.14038
(0.6421)
-30.6374
(-4.7079)*
-116.6621
(-3.6541)*
0.4903
(5.6034)*
0.1368
(1.3780)
0.1281
(1.2963)
0.2215
(2.5345)*
0.82

*t-statistics significant at 5% level or less

To evaluate the best forecast in any horizon, previous studies such as those by Christiano
(1989), HPS (1991, and Fisher (1995) are followed in using the root mean square error (RMSE)
measure. Table 4 presents the RMSE values for all five models over three different forecast
horizons. To reiterate, the forecasts are generated using a rolling-regression forecast method
where the in-sample regression period is extended one quarter at a time.
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Table Four: RMSE for forecasts over different horizons
RMSE values for forecasts of the various models

AR(4)

One quarter ahead

Four quarters ahead

Twelve quarters ahead

0.750162

0.735665

0.697726

0.792505

0.777376

0.728175

0.759487

0.743610

0.724363

0.787097

0.776273

0.754799

0.728281

0.723850

0.716098

0.757872

0.753415

0.743973

0.709787

0.701652

0.698050

0.704194

0.693700

0.684242

0.665462

0.659512

0.639282

0.688707

0.683009

0.657129

0.954041

0.952337

0.987512

0.863352

0.857674

0.879028

(CHANGES APPROACH)
AR(4)
LEVELS APPROACH
ARMA(4,4)
CHANGES APPROACH
ARMA(4,4)
(LEVELS APPROACH)
PHILLIPS CURVE
(CHANGES APPROACH)
PHILLIPS CURVE
(LEVELS APPROACH)
PSTAR-HPS
(CHANGES APPROACH)
PSTAR-HPS
(LEVELS APPROACH)
PSTAR-HOD
(CHANGES APPROACH)
PSTAR-HOD
(LEVELS APPROACH)
PSTAR-BASIC
(CHANGES APPROACH
PSTAR-BASIC
(LEVELS APPROACH)
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The different models are initially tested in terms of forecasting ability over the onequarter-ahead horizon, and then the forecasts are tested over the one-year-ahead (four-quarterahead) horizon. Forecasts are evaluated for all models formulated both in terms of accelerations
of inflation and levels of inflation. Table four presents the RMSE measures for all the models
over the k=1 and k=4 horizons. The model that performs the worst in terms of forecasts is
P*BASIC – this is not totally unexpected due to the simplistic nature of the equilibrium velocity
and output processes. The Phillips curve forecasts mildly out-perform the autoregressive
forecasts of inflation. The classic P*HPS approach and P*HOD are similar in terms of RMSE
measures. However, the lowest-error predictions of forecasts are generated by P*HOD; this
findings holds over both the shorter-term horizons and regardless of whether it is the changes of
inflation or the levels of inflation that are being predicted. Table 4 also includes a robustness
check for forecasting accuracy – the forecasting horizon is extended to the k=12 horizon. Again,
P*HOD out-performs the other models in terms of forecasting accuracy, both in changes of and
levels of inflation. In general a more refined variant of a P*-type model cannot be beaten by a
model based on pure past information.
A recent trend in the econometric literature has been the comparison of predictive
accuracy among forecasting models. This method of forecast evaluation extends the analysis
beyond RMSE measures because it tests for differences in the actual predictive power of the
models that are being compared. Diebold and Mariano (1995) suggest a technique which allows
for the testing of the significance of differences in forecasts. The basic methodology is presented
in Appendix A3, while the results are presented in Table 5 below.

Table 5: Results from the Diebold-Mariano approach
S statistic for forecasts over different horizons
1-qtr ahead
4-qtrs ahead
AR(4)
2.953231
-1.12125
ARMA(4,4)
3.384291
-1.61562
PHILLIPS
-0.57494
-0.66036
P*BASIC
-6.34648
2.293158
P*HOD
2.08268
-6.45529

12-qtrs ahead
-0.61392
-0.44765
-0.85421
-8.12123
2.759139

Null hypothesis: equal accuracy forecasts
Alternate hypothesis: Forecasts are significantly different in accuracy

The comparative distribution for the above statistics is a N(0,1), as explained in the
appendix. The S-statistics above represent the tests of equality of forecast accuracy between the
HPS P* approach and the other four models. Interestingly the Phillips curve model provides
significantly different forecasts over all three forecast horizons. The AR(4) and the ARMA(4,4)
models’ forecasts are significantly different from the HPS approach over the longer horizons
indicating that the predictive power of the HPS approach is significantly different from a forecast
based on pure past information over these horizons. P*-BASIC and the filter approach do not
provide significantly different forecasts over all three horizons when compared to the HPS
approach. Although the RMSE tests indicate that the Hodrick-Prescott filter approach provides
the superior forecasts, the Diebold-Mariano tests do not indicate that these forecasts are
significantly different from forecasts generated by the HPS approach.
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4. Robustness
Several robustness checks are performed. First, an interesting deviation from the
standard approach is to test for the source of improvement in leading P*-type models. To do this,
the HPS and HOD P* models are run with the velocity and output gaps interchanged
consecutively. The results are displayed in Table 6 below. Panel A in Table 6 shows the results
when the models are run in terms of accelerations of inflation while Panel B shows the results
when the models are run in terms of levels of inflation.
If indeed using a filter approach extracts velocity and output gaps with superior
explanatory power compared to P* HPS, then mixed models should outperform the HPS
approach (in terms of adjusted R-squared values). To test this approach the mixed models
(A’,A”,B’, and B”) in equations 15-18 are run against equation 10 (presented in section 5), and
equation 14 below. Panel A in Table 6 below displays the results for the changes approach while
panel B displays the results for the levels approach.
∆π t = δ + β 1 (v-v*) t −1 HPS + β 2 (y*-y) t −1 HPS + δ 1 ∆π t −1 + δ 2 ∆π t − 2 + δ 3 ∆π t −3 + δ 4 ∆π t − 4
+ µt

(14)

Mixed Model A’: π t = δ + β 1 (v-v*) t −1 HOD + β 2 (y*-y) t −1 HPS + δ 1 ∆π t −1 + δ 2 ∆π t − 2 +

δ 3 ∆π t −3 + δ 4 ∆π t − 4 + µ t

(15)

Mixed Model B’: π t = δ + β 1 (v-v*) t −1 HOD + β 2 (y*-y) t −1 HPS + δ 1 π t −1 + δ 2 π t − 2 + δ 3 π t −3
+ δ 4 π t −4 + µ t

(16)

Mixed Model A”: π t = α + β 1 (v-v*) t −1 HPS + β 2 (y*-y) t −1 HOD + δ 1 ∆π t −1 + δ 2 ∆π t − 2 +

δ 3 ∆π t −3 + δ 4 ∆π t − 4 + µ t

(17)

Mixed Model B”: π t = α + β 1 (v-v*) t −1 HPS + β 2 (y*-y) t −1 HOD + δ 1 π t −1 + δ 2 π t − 2 + δ 3 π t −3
+ δ 4 π t −4 + µ t

(18)
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Table 6: HPS P* versus mixed models
PANEL A
Dependent variable is change in inflation rate: independent variables are changes in
inflation (In-sample)
Model
HPS P*
Mixed model A’
Mixed Model B’
0.201764
0.023005
0.261406
δ
(1.535725)
(0.222347)
(2.114013)
-29.98755
-58.10852
(v-v*)HPS t −1
(-1.784007)
(-3.731277)
-11.71779
-15.22466
(y*-y)HPS t −1
(-2.568548)
(-3.676460)
-104.3773
(v-v*)HOD t −1
(-3.480518)
-27.72465
(y-y*)HOD t −1
(-4.038294)
-0.444628
-0.499517
-0.467549
∆π t −1
(-4.786594)
(-5.501491)
(-5.207471)
-0.310001
-0.369548
-0.311748
∆π t − 2
(-3.089018)
(-3.789201)
(-3.227720)
-0.177279
-0.162628
-0.234453
∆π t −3
(-1.756701)
(-1.673393)
(-2.402894)
0.096088
0.055486
0.120941
∆π t − 4
(1.029613)
(0.618330)
(1.340665)
Adjusted
0.21
0.27
0.27
R-squared
PANEL B
Dependent variable is levels of inflation rate: independent variables are levels of
inflation (In-sample)
Model
HPS P*
Mixed Model A”
Mixed Model B”
0.2132
0.194626
0.429544
δ
(0.8407)
(0.876678)
(2.642001)*
-28.7542
-13.67479
(v-v*)HPS t −1
(-1.5159)
(-2.571726)*
-13.3277
-17.66042
(y*-y)HPS t −1
(-3.0567)*
(-4.187511)*
-103.9247
(v-v*)HOD t −1
(-3.250237)*
-27.94137
(y-y*)HOD t −1
(-5.204373)*
0.5366
0.513334
0.451833
π t −1
(5.8917)*
(5.814903)*
(6.180847)*
0.1247
0.148146
0.108625
π t −2
(1.1946)
(1.467012)
(1.346231)
0.1216
0.139682
0.097278
π t −3
(1.1662)
(1.385895)
(1.203505)
0.2215
0.224730
0.260501
π t −4
(2.3745)*
(2.495593)*
(3.579481)*
Adjusted
0.80
0.81
0.83
R-squared
t-statistics significant at 5% level or less

As discussed earlier, and that is immediately apparent in Table 6 above, the velocity gap
under the HPS approach is insignificant in explaining both accelerations in and levels of inflation.
The following short discussion refers to panel A of Table 6 above. Mixed model A’ includes the
HPS velocity gap, and the HOD output gap. Interestingly, in this formulation, the HPS velocity
gap becomes significant. The HOD output gap has double the explanatory power of the HPS
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output gap and the adjusted R-squared for this model is higher than the unadulterated HPS
approach. Next a mixed model that has the HOD velocity gap and the HPS output gap is tested
against the pure HPS approach (model B’). Both gaps are significant and the model has the same
adjusted R-squared as model A’. The mixed models in panel A out-perform the HPS model (in
terms of adjusted R-squared values).
Panel B displays the results for the comparisons between equation 10, and the mixed
models represented in equations 15 and 17. The results are very similar to panel A – the mixed
models outperform the pure HPS approach, in terms of adjusted R-squared values. The
conclusion echoes earlier findings in this paper – the HPS approach does not adequately capture
the effect of money on inflation. Both mixed models and the pure HOD approach capture the
effect of the velocity gap better.
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Table 7: Tests for the Nixon dummy
PANEL A (TESTING FOR THE NIXON DUMMY
Dependent variable is change in inflation rate: independent variables are
changes in inflation (In-sample)
Model
HPS P*
P*BASIC
P*HOD
0.207688
0.002681
0.029917
δ
(1.660459)
(0.024825)
(0.281188)
-11.92852
-8.090476
-24.63932
(p-p*) t −1
(-2.959013)*
(-2.489125)*
(-3.125330)*
0.986384
1.203903
0.702859
NIXD
(1.633021)
(2.022018)*
(1.110336)
-0.427334
-0.449344
-0.456992
π t −1
(-4.643996)
(-4.877850)*
(-4.963736)*
-0.310129
-0.280701
-0.323710
π t −2
(-3.129537)*
(-2.854520)*
(-3.248594)*
-0.160973
-0.126106
-0.183912
π t −3
(-1.598629)
(-1.270493)
(-1.794030)
0.115201
0.143481
0.096675
π t −4
(1.229788)
(1.544206)
(1.019300)
Adjusted
0.22
0.21
0.23
R-squared
PANEL B (TESTING FOR THE NIXON DUMMY)
Dependent variable is levels of inflation rate: independent variables are
levels of inflation (In-sample)
Model
HPS P*
P*BASIC
P*HOD
0.224333
0.455842
0.295982
δ
(0.985865)
(1.944587)
(1.316532)
-13.68675
-11.34644
-28.11221
(p-p*) t −1
(-3.402534)*
(-3.554454)*
(-3.877039)*
0.830103
0.532824
0.264886
NIXD
(1.367898)
(0.854537)
(0.416169)
0.528864
0.509856
0.504516
π t −1
(5.839393)*
(5.584689)*
(5.585837)*
0.126343
0.107076
0.106095
π t −2
(1.221534)
(1.037674)
(1.038150)
0.133334
0.108346
0.109056
π t −3
(1.279427)
(1.045058)
(1.062041)
0.215205
0.221175
0.173994
π t −4
(2.315999)*
(2.429669)*
(1.954699)
Adjusted
0.80
0.81
0.81
R-squared
t-statistics significant at 5% or less.

As a second robustness check, the forecasting horizon (for all models) is increased to a
k=12 horizon over the period 1990:1 2003:4. As mentioned earlier, to evaluate the best forecast
in any horizon, previous studies such as those by Christiano (1989), HPS (1991, and Fisher
(1995) are followed in using the root mean square error (RMSE) measure. Table five presents the
RMSE measures for all the models over the k=12 horizons. The filter approach again outperforms the other models in having the lowest RMSE values.
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As a third robustness check, the models are tested with an explicit variable that captures
stagflation. The models are extended with the inclusion of the Nixon dummy. This allows for
the control of the OPEC oil crisis when the over-riding concern was stagflation. The Nixon
dummy however, turns out to be insignificant for all formulations of the P*-type models,
seemingly indicating that the price gaps are able to capture the supply shocks represented by the
OPEC oil crisis.
As a final robustness check, the p-star models are tested using divisia aggregates. Divisia
aggregates are different from simple sum aggregates because they are weighted by the returns to
the components. Since the Hodrick Prescott method involves extracting a trend in velocity that
captures movements over time, it is expected that the smoothed trend will capture innovations in
money. Divisia aggregates are measured based on weighting of different innovations. If the HP
filter has done a good job, then it is expected that the velocity gap should be insignificant when
divisia aggregates are used because divisia aggregates have already accounted for shifts in
velocity. The results are presented in Table 8 below (the regression samples are adjusted for the
availability of divisia aggregate data). In turns out however, that for both the levels approach and
the changes approach, both pgaphod and vgaphod are still significant in explaining inflation.
This suggests that velocity gaps capture information beyond monetary innovations that are
encompassed in divisia aggregates.

20

Table 8: Robustness checks with divisia aggregates
Price Gaps Based on Divisia Aggregates
Dependent variable is change in inflation rate: independent variables are changes in inflation
(Sample is 1960:1 1992:4)
Model
HPS P*
P* Basic
P* - HP filter
0.241607
0.795775
0.007997
δ
(1.842982)
(0.795094)
(0.073370)
-2.147260
(v-v*)HPS t −1
(-0.592456)
-13.82529
(y*-y)HPS t −1
(-3.085693)
-118.3765
(v-v*)HOD t −1
(-3.370047)
-5.431309
(y-y*)HOD t −1
(-0.789061)
-4.453175
(v-v*)BASIC t −1
(-1.105657)
-8.519857
(y*-y)BASIC t −1
(-2.532160)
-0.440903
-0.416312
-0.396306
∆π t −1
(-4.686397)
(-4.425117)
(-4.315573)
-0.318882
-0.286326
-0.243168
∆π t − 2
(-3.138784)
(-2.836243)
(-2.468316)
-0.195449
-0.160502
-0.097979
∆π t −3
(-1.920400)
(-1.591337)
(-0.987381)
0.077009
0.102569
0.167966
∆π t − 4
(0.818658)
(1.091468)
(1.800289)
Adjusted
0.19
0.17
0.19
R-squared
Price Gaps Based on Divisia Aggregates
Dependent variable is levels of inflation rate: independent variables are levels of inflation rate
(Sample is 1960:1 1992:4)
Model
HPS P*
P* Basic
P* - HP filter
0.375381
0.470492
0.289886
δ
(1.626217)
(0.482971)
(1.232163)
-1.705492
(v-v*)HPS t −1
(-0.462429)
-14.31654
(y*-y)HPS t −1
(-3.264822)
-109.3706
(v-v*)HOD t −1
(-3.062224)
-10.92888
(y-y*)HOD t −1
(-1.609495)
-1.351374
(v-v*)BASIC t −1
(-0.328800)
-12.30784
(y*-y)BASIC t −1
(-3.687289)
0.537325
0.509516
0.556633
π t −1
(5.844902)
(5.532087)
(6.040949)
0.108345
0.093430
0.119458
π t −2
(1.034381)
(0.901896)
(1.127784)
0.108239
0.092051
0.108426
π t −3
(1.032297)
(0.890047)
(1.025472)
0.154904
0.218351
0.181541
π t −4
(1.695314)
(2.315554)
(2.019761)
0.79
0.80
0.79
Adjusted R-squared
All gaps are calculated according to various methodologies presented in section

*t-statistics significant at 5% level or less
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5. Conclusion
Economic literature is filled with different models to forecast inflation. The literature has
suggested that the Fed should target inflation forecasts rather than the actual inflation rate itself,
because of the lag between monetary policy and the effect on inflation. The P* approach was
hailed by many as an innovative approach to forecasting inflation. Redefining the velocity gap
and the output gap in the model by using a Hodrick-Prescott smoothing method gains better
forecasts for a one-quarter-ahead horizon. However, the P* model gained fame because of its
forecasting capability over the longer horizons between two and three years.
This paper finds, however, that P*-HOD improves upon P*-HPS, in terms of forecast
accuracy. In both the accelerations and levels of inflation specification, the HOD price gap has
double the explanatory power of the HPS gap. Moreover, when the gap is separated into the
velocity and output gaps, the HPS velocity gap is insignificant. This seems to indicate that the
HPS model is unable to capture the effect of money on inflation, and the significance of its price
gap stems from supply side effects.
The difference in magnitude displayed by the HOD price gap has important monetary policy
implications, because of the monetary policy response to the correct identification of the gap.
The direction of the gap is also important - if the gap between P* and P is positive, this indicates
that inflation will accelerate in the future to meet P*. If the Fed wishes to control inflation, they
would then need to increase the interest rate. One the other hand, if the gap is negative, inflation
will decelerate and monetary loosening may be in order. Only the P* approach with the HodrickPrescott filter displays the importance of the money-side shock in explaining inflation.
Ultimately, this paper provides support for the link between money and prices – naïve models
based on past information cannot beat the P*-type models.
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Appendix 1: Tests for structural breaks in velocity and output gaps under the three P*type
approaches

Break

Maximal

Dates

f-stat

vgapbasic

1995:1

10.21069

ygapbasic

1973:3

4.835721

vagphps

1995:1

11.07638

ygaphps

1960:3

4.521267

vgaphod

2001:3

3.94824

ygaphod

1960:3

4.592403

Based on bootstrapping techniques prescribed by Lawrence Christiano (1988), critical F statistics
(for 5000 iterations) indicate no structural breaks for HOD gaps, but indicate the presence of a
structural break for vgapbasic and vgaphps at the indicated dates.
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Appendix 2: Velocity gaps under the HPS and HOD approaches over time
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Gaps calculated under the Hodrick-Prescott filter approach clearly indicate mean reversion
around 0. Calculating the deviations from trend using the Hodrick-Prescott filter approach
defines a smoother set of deviations that improve forecasting ability.

26

Appendix 3: A Brief Explanation of the Diebold Mariano test for the null hypothesis of
equal accuracy in two forecasts.
^

^

^

Consider two forecasts: { y it }Tt=1 and { y jt }Tt=1 of the time series { y t }Tt=1 . The associated forecast
^

^

errors are { e it }Tt=1 and { e jt }Tt=1 . A time-t loss function associated with a forecast i is identified as
^

^

^

^

g( y t , yit ) . In most cases the loss function will be a direct function of the forecast error, that is
g( y t , yit ) = g(e it ) . The loss function is hereafter referred to as g(e it ) .
The hypotheses associated with the D-M test are as follows:
H 0 = E[ g(e it ) ] = E[ g(e jt ) ] or E[ d t ] = 0, where d t ≡ [ g(e it ) - g(e jt ) ] is the loss differential.
The null hypothesis then states that the two forecasts are equally accurate, or that the population
mean of the series of loss differentials over time t is 0.
The path of the loss differential series is { d t }Tt=1 . If this series is covariance stationary and short
memory, then standard results are used to deduce the asymptotic distribution of its mean.
_

d
T (d − µ ) →
N (0,2πf d (0)),

where

_

d=

1
T

∑ [g(e

it

) − g(e jt )]

is the sample mean loss differential,

1 ∞
f d (0) =
∑ γ d (τ )
2π τ = −∞
is the spectral density function of the loss differential at frequency 0,

γ d (τ ) = E[(d t − µ )(d t −τ − µ )

is the autocovariance of the loss differential at displacement τ , and µ is the population mean
loss differential.
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_

In large samples, the sample mean loss differential d is approximately normally distributed with
mean µ , and variance 2πf d (0) / T. The N(0,1) statistic for testing the null hypothesis of equal
forecast accuracy is then the following s-statistic

_

d

S1 =

,

^

2π f (0)
T
^

f (0) is a consistent estimator of f d (0) . Diebold and Mariano show that a consistent
estimator of 2πf d (0) is found by taking a weighted sum of the available sample autocovariances,

where

^

2π f d (0) =

(T −1)

∑

τ = − ( T −1)

1(

τ
S (T )

^

) γ d (τ )

where
^

γ d (τ ) =

_
_
1
(d t − d )(d T − τ − d ),
∑
T

1(τ / S (T )) is the lag window and S(T) is the truncation lag.
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Chapter 2

Re-examining the Relationship Between Financial Development and
Growth – A Developing Country Perspective

Many studies have examined the relationship between economic growth and
finance. Some of the continuing issues in this area include the choice of a clear
proxy for financial development and the question of causality between financial
development and economic growth. This paper attempts to answer these
questions from a developing country perspective, while controlling for financial
repression. The proxy of choice is the ratio of currency outside the banking
system to real output. This proxy is unique in that it is related to the degree of
financial repression, and thus relates differently to economic growth depending
on the level of financial development. The statistics support the hypothesis of
the U-shaped behaviour of CB with financial liberalization. The empirical
results show that CB relates negatively to growth in countries that are less
financially liberalized and positively with growth in countries that are more
financially liberalized. The literature has used real interest rates as a measure of
financial repression. An innovative measure of financial repression is then
proposed that combines the use of currency inside banks and currency outside
banks, and is tested concurrently with a broad money depth measure. The study
is carried out using a panel approach, and the sample is also divided into
different geographical regions, in order to see whether the relationship differs
between geographical regions. The study concludes that there is overwhelming
evidence that financial repression, which is indicative of financial underdevelopment is negatively related to growth. Recent econometric Granger
causality methods are then applied to test the finance-growth hypotheses.
JEL Classification: O11,O57

Developing countries have been engaging in financial reforms for the past two decades
now. The purpose of this study is to look at the empirical relationship between financial
development and economic development from a developing country perspective, while
controlling for geographical proximity. It must be noted that the relationship between financial
development and growth is by no means widely accepted.
Lillian Kamal, Department of Economics, West Virginia University, P.O. Box 6025, Morgantown, WV
26506. E-mail: ltkamal@mail.wvu.edu
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Robert Lucas (1988) has suggested that the link has been “badly over-stressed”. Stern
(1989) writes a review of development economics, but does not mention the financial system.
However, financial reforms in most developing countries are part and parcel of a move towards
establishing economies that are more heavily private sector led. This paper then attempts to
highlight the relationship, if one exists, but purely from a developing country perspective. To this
end, the effect of financial development on growth is tested while controlling for financial
repression, and geographical proximity. The rest of the paper is organized as follows: section 1
discusses past studies in the area, and discusses the proxies of choice within this paper. Section 2
is the methodology section; sections 3 and 4 present results and robustness checks, and section 5
presents concluding remarks.

1. I) Theory
The literature in this area is vast. The seminal work in the area was by Goldsmith (1969).
In his paper, he measured the level of financial development by using the value of financial
intermediary assets relative to GNP. The key assumption here was that the size of the financial
system has a positive correlation with the level of financial services provided. This study was
carried out on 35 countries with pre-1964 data, and also did not control for other factors
influencing economic growth. Goldsmith was able to find evidence that, as countries develop,
the size of their banking sectors tend to become larger relative to national output. Overall, this
study did not attempt to make any causal relationships. It simply indicated a correlation between
financial development and economic development. Some criticism has been aimed at the
measure Goldsmith chose for financial development – critics argue that the size of the formal
financial system may not be captured well by this measure.
McKinnon (1973) and Shaw (1973) were among the first to provide a theoretical
background for why financial development could cause growth. King and Levine (1993a,b) look
at 77 countries and also systematically control for other factors affecting economic growth. They
also look at the capital accumulation and productivity growth channels, and create new measures
of the level of financial development.
Since then the literature has looked at financial development through measures of
banking activity (King and Levine, 1993 a,b) and measures of stock market development (Atje
and Jovanovic, 1993), and Levine and Zervos (1998). The continuous problem identified in the
literature has been a measure that can adequately capture the degree of financial development in
all its changing aspects. Several issues exist – the services provided by the financial system are
diverse – these include mobilization of savings, diversification of risk, and management of the
payment system. Secondly, the agents that provide these financial services are diverse – these
include banks, securities markets, and insurance companies, among others (Andres, Ignacio, and
Lopez-Salido, 1999). A third issue that has been tackled in a few instances in the literature is the
fact that financial development also involves financial market deregulation, and this involves a
reduced level of government restrictions, such as interest rate controls and price distortions in the
financial sector.
Two strands have developed in this literature. The development of these opposing
schools of thought is reminiscent of the chicken-egg problem. Patrick (1966) coined the terms for
the two opposing hypotheses. One is the demand-following hypothesis that proposes that
financial development responds passively to economic growth. The financial sector thus
develops as a result of an increased demand for financial services that is fuelled by the growth of
the real sector. The basic logic is as follows – as the real sector grows, there will be a greater
demand by firms for external sources of finance. There then develops a role for financial

30
intermediaries such as banks. Thus the banking sector evolves out of a need to match firms
(borrowers) and households (savers). Clearly the causation in this case would run from economic
growth to finance.
The supply-leading hypothesis proposes the polar opposite. Basically, this theory states
that the creation of the financial sector occurs in advance of the demand for it. The supplyleading hypothesis stresses the importance of the financial sector in transferring funds between
low-growth and high-growth sectors, and highlights the importance of the financial sector in
causing an entrepreneurial response in these high-growth sectors. (Kar, and Pentecost, 2000). In
this case, the causation runs from financial development to growth.
The direction of causality is vital for the choice of development strategy (Hurlin and
Venet, 2004). If it is determined that the optimal allocation of resources within an economy is
enhanced by the development of the financial system (supply-leading hypothesis), then
development strategy should be centred around financial sector liberalization. For example,
policy should be focused on the free entry of firms into the banking sector, controls on
international capital movement should be lifted and interest rate ceilings should be removed. On
the other hand, if it is determined that economic growth causes the development of the financial
sector, development policy should be centred on other growth-enhancing policies.
What impact does the financial system theoretically have on an economy? To understand
this link, one must first understand the functions that a financial system performs. Levine (1997)
has listed five functions that a financial system performs. These are to:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

assist the trading, hedging, diversification and pooling of risk,
allocate resources,
supervise managers,
mobilize savings, and
enhance the exchange of goods and services.

In general, the literature has presented two channels through which each of these
financial functions can affect economic growth – the capital accumulation channel and the
technological innovation channel. A financial system will alter the rate of capital accumulation
by affecting the rate of savings, or by reallocating savings among new and different capital
producing technologies. The financial system will also affect the rate of technological innovation
and thus affect the steady state level of growth in an economy.
It is expected that from a developing country perspective, development of a financial
system will affect savings mobilization initially. The logic of this idea is as follows: developing
countries rely on the banking system. As the financial system develops, the banking system is
able to provide varied instruments that allow the mobilization of savings in new ways. Savers are
then able to take advantage of better financial instruments that provide them with a better riskreturn trade-off. Ultimately financial development means that savers can hold better portfolios.
But financial development is also expected to affect economic growth through savings
mobilization in another way. Producers in an economy that is financially under-developed do not
have access to multiple investors. There exists an informational asymmetry. Thus they produce
at a scale that is economically inefficient. A developed financial system provides a better
opportunity for the efficient exchange of resources between savers and firms. Firms can thus
expand, and increase their production. As they produce at a larger economic scale, they also
become more efficient and productivity is improves, raising the rate of economic growth. As
Levine (1997) puts it, financial development can “profoundly affect economic development”.
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Figure 1: The Theoretical Link Between Finance and Growth (Levine, 1997)
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Given that development of the financial sector is expected to positively impact economic
growth, there are factors that are often present in developing countries that can hinder the
development of the finance sector. Governments may place regulations on the financial sector in
the form of price distortions and restrictions in order to maintain the financial sector as a source
of public finance. Examples of restrictions that often exist in developing countries are subsidized
or directed credit, credit rationing, collusive contracts between public firms and banks, and
interest rate ceilings on deposits (Creane, et al, 2003). These kind of distortions in a free financial
sector are commonly referred to as “financial repression”. Some studies have even gone as far as
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to link a strong degree of financial repression with a fall in real GDP growth of over one
percentage point per year.
Giovanni and de Melo (1993) have defined financial repression as a combination of
controls on international capital flows and restrictions on domestic interest rates. Typically
researchers consider financial repression to be the product of artificially set interest rates that
causes real interest rates to fall well below the rates of inflation. Traditionally, domestic real
interest rates (henceforth referred to as RI) are used in the literature as a measure of financial
repression. Government revenue is then calculated as the difference between the foreign and
domestic cost of funds multiplied by the stock of government debt. Giovanni and de Melo (1993)
find that the revenue that governments make from financial repression is substantial and in some
cases is even comparable to the revenue from seigniorage. It is important to note that in the
absence of international financial controls, most cases of domestic controls on interest rates could
be bypassed foreign borrowing and lending. However, controls on domestic interest rates are
often coupled with restrictions on international borrowing and lending and this leads to a
compromised financial system.
The literature on the finance-growth relationship has utilized both the cross-sectional
approach and the time series approach. Using a cross-sectional approach requires the averaging
out of data over long time periods and then using the data in cross-sectional regressions that are
aimed at explaining the cross-country variations in growth rates. These sorts of studies are then
able to gauge the average effect of variables that affect economic growth rates. Apart from the
seminal King and Levine (1993) paper, there are other studies by Gelb (1989), Roubini and Salai-Martin (1992), and Fry (1996) that all use a cross-sectional approach. However, cross-sectional
studies have their fair share of critics. The users of this technique have themselves pointed out
shortcomings with this approach. Evans (1995) has mentioned that there could be econometric
problems associated with the heterogeneity of slope coefficients across countries.
The classic paper in the finance-growth literature is the King and Levine (1993) paper –
the study covers the 1960-89 period and focuses on 77 countries. The authors use various proxies
for financial development, which are mostly monetary depth measures, and three growth
variables (average growth rate of real GDP per capita, average growth rate of capital stock per
capita, and a measure of total factor productivity). Levine’s paper utilizes cross-country data, and
as Levine himself alludes to, there are some problems with using this kind of data. There is the
difficulty in establishing causality in cross-country data sets, and also the problem of average
effects of financial development. This is, however, acceptable if one considers that the basic
characteristics between the countries are similar in nature. A number of authors have decided to
study time series data on individual countries – time series data has the advantage of allowing the
researcher to search for possible long-term relationships such as cointegration that would
illuminate the link between variables better.
Time series studies have not, however, clarified the relationship between finance and
growth. De Gregorio and Guidotti (1995) who discuss the pros and cons of various financial
development proxies, have actually found a negative relationship between finance and growth.
Recent studies have begun to use panel data techniques to examine the issue. Beck and Levine
(2002) look at financial development through banks and also through the stock market. They find
that stock market liquidity – this is the ratio of the total value of shares traded to market
capitalization – is positively related to growth.
Pesaran and Smith (1995) have suggested that panel data techniques with averaged data
may still suffer from econometric problems. Past studies have sometimes averaged data over a
few years to remove business-cycle influences. This may cause the loss of information on longrun relationships. It has been suggested (Demetriades and Andrinova, 2003) that increasing data
samples to forty or fifty years would make evidence from time-series utilizing techniques more
conclusive, especially if the data is available in quarterly frequencies. It must be recognized,
however, that in studies that involve many countries, the lack of data availability is always an
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important consideration. Developed countries usually have better data availability when
compared to developing countries – since this is a developing country study; data restrictions are
of prime concern. Ultimately, while there is a dearth of papers that have looked at the
relationship between financial development and growth from various angles, including using
different indicators for financial development, different time periods, and groups of different
countries, data that spans longer time periods becomes essential to make more conclusive
statements on the exact nature of the relationship.

1. II) Proxies of Financial Development
Chen and Fische (1993) have discussed a theoretical reasoning that suggests that currency
outside the banking system may be a good inverse proxy for financial development in developing
countries. They note that deposit insurance schemes do not have a very important role in
developing countries which have less diversified economic bases. Depositors thus tend to shy
away from the banking system. The result is that alternate informal arrangements such as savings
clubs and rotating credit associations become more important in bridging the gap between the
borrower and the lender. This argument provides a further theoretical basis for the choice of
currency outside the banking system as an inverse proxy for financial development. The more
developed a financial system, the greater the role that deposit insurance plays in the banking
system, and thus the greater the amount of money within the banking system.
Moreover, real interest rates in developing countries are on average, negative. This in
essence, defines developing countries as financial repressed economies. Standard money demand
models such as the Baumol-Tobin approach indicate that money holdings are inversely related to
real interest rates. Therefore if real interest rates are negative, this would indicate a low level of
deposits. Financial repression, which is indicative of low financial development, is then
characterized by a low ratio of deposits. Thus private sector funds are not in the banking system
but outside of it. The higher the level of currency outside the banking system (given a financially
repressed economy), the lower the level of financial development, and the more restricted the
access to those funds by investment projects. This compromises the link between investment and
economic growth. Thus a high ratio of currency outside the banking system should be negatively
related to economic growth.
The logic behind using currency outside the banking system relative to real output as a
proxy for financial development is as follows: as a country begins to develop its financial sector,
the banking system develops first as an initial bridge between savers and borrowers. If there is a
large amount of money outside the banking system, this would indicate that the banking sector is
compromised (perhaps through financial repression) and savers do not have access to varied
instruments through the banking sector. Thus a large amount of money outside the banking
sector would seem to be an indicator of a lower level of financial development. Most developing
countries began the process of financial development within the last three decades. More evolved
methods of linkage between savers and borrowers such as mutual funds or stock markets are
relatively recent introductions into these countries.
At an intermediate level of financial sector development, CB may actually fall as savers
explore increased options within the banking sector and firms flock to the banks for their
financing needs. However, as the level of financial sector development increases further, CB
(and also deposits within the banking sector) may actually rise again as the development of
institutions such as mutual funds and stock markets develop. This is a proxy that can reflect the
development of a financial sector given the removal of the elements of financial repression. In
countries in the initial stages of financial sector liberalization, the ratio is expected to be high, and
negatively related to growth. As countries reach the intermediate stage, the ratio is expected to
fall, and then as countries reach the more advanced stages of financial sector development, the
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ratio is expected to rise again. It must be noted of course, that financial sector development here
is relative since the sample consists entirely of developing countries. In the intermediate and
higher growth countries, CB is expected to become positively related to growth. Overall CB
essentially fulfills the requirements of being a measure of financial development that can capture
the degree of financial development in all its changing aspects.
The use of CB as a ratio of financial development begs the use of the opposite of CB –
deposits within the banking sector over gdp (henceforth referred to as DGDP) as another proxy.
The results are expected to indicate the opposite relationship (when compared with CB) – a
positive relationship with economic growth.
An interesting criticism of the CB proxy arises due to the concept of dollarization, which
is popular in developing countries with weak macroeconomic systems, and weak local currencies.
Dollarization occurs when the residents of a country use a dominant foreign currency in parallel
with the local currency unit (LCU). Contrary to what the name of the phenomenon suggests,
dollarization does not necessarily mean the use of only the US dollar – currently the Euro, the
Australian dollar and the Danish kronor are being used as parallel currencies. Dollarization could
occur in three main ways – it could occur unofficially, it could occur in a bimonetary system,
where the foreign currency is legal but a secondary currency to the LCU, and it could also occur
where a country officially abandons the use of its LCU in favour of the foreign currency.
Dollarization occurs because residents of a country are seeking stability which cannot be
found in the LCU. Due to excessive seigniorage or discretionary monetary policy, there may be
excessive inflation, and the LCU may devalue excessively. High and unstable inflation rates lead
to a lower level of investment and ultimately lower economic growth. The loss of value of the
LCU leads to a substitution into the foreign currency unit. Opponents of dollarization mention
that excessive dollarization leads to a lack of control for domestic monetary policy.
Most of the Latin American and African countries in the sample have experienced
excessive dollarization at some point, and in most cases, the dollar or the currency of the former
colonial power (in the case of a few African countries) continues to be a major unofficial force.
CB is thus not immune to the effects of dollarization. Excessive dollarization involves residents
substituting into the foreign currency – CB will thus rise as individual transfer local currency
units into dollars and other strong foreign currencies. Conversely in periods of local currency
stability, residents regain faith in the local currency and CB will fall. Thus a high CB level may
be expected during periods of high dollarization. This may of course lead to the use of the proxy
to indicate periods of excessive dollarization.
Official dollarization is empirically easier to examine than unofficial dollarization, and so
CB is examined in the case of two official dollarization periods for Argentina where President
Carlos Menem declared official dollarization (based on the US dollar) in 1999. A priori it is
expected that Argentina’s CB ratio would increase as there is excessive substitution into the US
dollar. The graphs of the behaviour of CB (and the innovative approach to measuring financial
repression, FR) in Argentina over time are presented in the appendix.
Monetary depth measures have been used several times in past studies as representative
of the formal size of the financial sector in an economy. Goldsmith (1969) discussed the nature
of the financial sector in developing countries. Firms in developing countries resort to greater
levels of self-finance than firms in developed countries. When financial instruments are issued
by firms, they are primarily procured by financial institutions rather than private savers. There
are few large “organized” markets for the trade of securities such as bonds, mortgages, and
stocks, mostly because such markets require economies of scale that are generally not present in
developing countries. There is thus limited direct contact between the savers and the borrowers
and instead indirect interaction through the monetary mechanism, which is the lifeline of the
financial sector. It therefore becomes reasonable to develop theoretical models where money
(defined to include all deposits in the banking sector, as well as currency) is the only financial
asset available to savers. (McKinnon, 1973)
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Uncertainties regarding risk and return are acute in developing countries and money
becomes the asset that is most risk-free and default-free for short-term transactions. Since lenders
do not have access to sophisticated methods of risk-analysis (available in developed countries),
financial instruments other than money cannot be well marketed. Hence money becomes the
choice instrument of private capital. (McKinnon, 1973)

2. I) Methodology
Three proxies of financial development are used in this paper – CB, DGDP, and M - the
choice of these measures is based on what makes logical and theoretical sense from a developing
country perspective. Lack of continuous data series for developing countries limits the sample
size to 32 countries. 1995 is the base year for the consumer price index data for all thirty-two
countries. Raw data is transformed into the required variables of interest as follows: economic
growth is calculated as the percentage change in gdp per capita; inflation is calculated as the
percentage change in the consumer price index. Real interest rates are calculated using the Fisher
Identity, and are the difference between the nominal rate of return on 3-6 month deposits at banks
and the inflation rate. Currency outside the banking system (CB) is calculated as the ratio of
currency outside domestic banks to nominal gdp. Banking sector deposits (DGDP) is calculated
as the ratio of total deposits (including checking, time and savings deposits) in the banking sector
to nominal gdp. Monetary depth (M) is the ratio of broad money (M2) to nominal gdp. All the
data is procured from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators, and the IMF’s
International Financial Statistics.
For the purposes of this study, M provides the standard against which other proxies are
tested. Greater broad money or narrow money depth indicates greater financial deepening, and a
greater size of the formal financial sector, and thus represents greater financial development. As
mentioned though, these measures are prone to criticism, hence the search for more theoretically
sound proxies is a worthwhile cause.
This paper proposes a new measure for financial repression that actually combines both
two proxies of financial development - CB and DGDP, and creates a new variable called FR
(CB/DGDP). It is proposed that the ratio of currency outside banks to currency inside banks can
best proxy for financial repression. If this ratio is low, then it could reflect a banking sector
where savings and lending are allotted according to market forces. This ratio would be low only
if there was a marked absence of real interest rate ceilings and directed lending. This proxy is
especially important for countries where there is considerable government interference in the
banking sector, that is, in less liberalized countries. For example, most of the Sub-Saharan
African countries still have banking sectors that are less developed than those of Asian countries,
and where government still have interest rate ceilings in place. In South East Asian countries, in
comparison, where financial sector liberalization has been underway for almost two decades,
financial repression is less of an issue.
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2. II) The following broad null hypotheses are tested in this paper:
I.

II.

III.

IV.

V.
VI.

In the lower growth countries (the African group of countries) that have less
developed financial sectors, the CB ratio is expected to be high (this follows from
Goldsmith’s (1969) findings). In the intermediate group of countries (the Latin
American set) the ratio is expected to be lower than the African set, and in the more
financially liberalized group of countries (the South East Asian set) CB is expected to
rise again. Thus the null hypothesis is the CB should display a U-shaped behaviour
in relation to the level of economic development and financial sector liberalization.
In relation to using CB as a proxy for financial development, it is expected that a
high currency outside the banking system to real gdp ratio will have a negative
relationship with economic growth, especially in countries that are in the early
sample of financial sector liberalization. The null hypothesis is then that CB should
be negatively related to growth for the less liberalized group of countries, that is, the
African sample of countries.
It follows that DGDP should be inversely correlated with CB, and thus DGDP should
have a positive relationship with economic growth. The null hypothesis here is that
DGDP should be positively correlated with growth in all the sample countries. The
reasoning here is that even when an economy is more financially liberalized, the
banking sector is still important in growth as it forms the allocative bridge between
savings and growth projects.
It is expected that a larger formal financial sector should be positively related to
growth, but with a caveat. The M variable proxies for the size of the formal financial
sector, and its relationship with economic growth is expected to be positive, but only
if a dummy variable for money growth is included. This effectively controls for the
effects of seigniorage, which has been common in developing countries. The null
hypothesis here states that the relationship between M and economic growth should
be positive when excess money growth is controlled for.
RI is expected to be higher (in negative values) for the African set of countries and
display positive or higher positive values for the other two geographical groupings.
In relation to the unique new measure of financial repression, FR, the ratio is
expected to be higher in value in the African sample of countries as opposed to the
other two groups, as financial repression has been higher in this set.
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Table 1: Behaviour of Financial Development Proxies Over Time for the Different
Regions (Mean Values Over Time)
Period 1970CB*

M*

DGDP*

RI**

FR*

Full sample

0.489

21.991

0.186

-8.133

3.979

Africa

0.477

21.202

0.171

-5.917

4.849

Latin America

0.402

18.946

0.199

-23.841

2.367

South-East Asia

0.601

26.745

0.219

-0.678

2.995

CB*

M*

DGDP*

RI**

FR*

Full sample

0.496

28.894

0.236

3.145

3.225

Africa

0.503

27.581

0.207

-7.803

4.148

Latin America

0.388

23.219

0.222

40.824

1.956

South-East Asia

0.569

37.319

0.326

4.216

1.806

CB*

M*

DGDP*

RI**

FR*

Full sample

0.475

32.256

0.269

-1.762

3.104

Africa

0.468

26.889

0.214

-3.849

4.089

Latin America

0.368

24.486

0.223

0.048

1.948

South-East Asia

0.589

52.032

0.458

2.477

1.423

1980

Period 19811990

Period 19912002

*Nominal values **Real values
***All entries are mean values over sample countries.

In Table 1 above, CB is the ratio of currency outside the banking system to GDP, M is the ratio of
M2 to GDP, DGDP is the ratio of banking sector deposits to GDP, RINT is the real interest rate
(calculated as per the Fisher Identity), and FR is CB/DGDP. Table 1 above clearly supports null
hypothesis 1 – the CB ratios display the U-shaped characteristic in relation to the level of
financial sector development. In the African and South East Asian group of countries, the CB
values are consistently higher than those in the Latin American group. Hypothesis 1 is then
accepted in this particular 33-country sample set.
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Table 2: Summary Statistics for all proxies (FD and financial repression) for full
sample and regions
Period 1970CB*

M*

DGDP*

RI**

FR*

Full sample

0.486

27.815

0.231

-2.398

3.432

Africa

0.481

25.221

0.197

-5.737

4.361

Latin America

0.385

22.391

0.215

4.441

2.090

South-East Asia

0.587

39.508

0.338

1.907

2.063

2002

*Nominal values **Real values

The above descriptive statistics in Table 2 reveal some interesting facts about the
relationship between financial development and financial repression. When the descriptive
statistics are calculated by region, it is evident that the overall sample statistics conceal significant
differences between the regions. The overall sample is heavily weighted towards the African
countries, which are greater in number in the sample than the countries from the two other
regions. The African sample is close to the average CB value for the full sample. South East
Asia on the other hand, has a higher CB ratio than the full sample average. This is not surprising
because the average South East Asian country is more financially liberalized (in terms of the
availability of non-bank financial instruments and a longer existence of fully functioning stock
markets) than the countries in, for example, the African sample. For the full period 1970-2002,
the CB values again display the U-shaped behaviour that was displayed in Table 1.
Within the banking sector, South East Asian countries also have higher ratios of DGDP
reflecting not only a greater degree of economic growth (thus a greater savings ratio), but also a
greater degree of saver faith and financial return in the banking sector due to less financial
repression. The overall sample’s statistics indicate that on average, the African group of
countries is financially repressed (reflected by negative RI). As the analysis proceeds to the Latin
American and South East Asian groups of countries, the RI values on average become positive.
The evidence then suggests that null hypothesis 5 is accepted.
The new FR variable highlights the degree of financial repression even more starkly. The
degree of financial repression (as measured by FR) is more than twice that of both the Latin
American and the South East Asian sample. This indicates that a very high degree of money is
outside the banking sector in the African sample. In these countries, that have a lesser degree of
financial development, the non-bank financial sector is rather under-developed and there are not
many alternative instruments such as mutual funds or long-standing and fully functioning stock
markets. Thus savers shy way from the banking sector, not only due to low economic growth
(which causes a low savings rate), but also due to depressed real interest rates (as evidenced by
the average negative real interest rates in the African sample). Overall then, the FR values
behave as expected and on average, fall as finance become more liberalized – this evidence
supports null hypothesis 6.
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It is interesting to consider the relationship between the proxies themselves, and also with
investment. This relationship is not a priori clear-cut. CB could be expected to be inversely
correlated with DGDP, since the higher the level of currency outside the banking sector, the
lower the level of currency inside the banking sector. However, in a case where an economy is
highly developed, a high level of CB could go hand in hand with an increased level of DGDP
because both bank and non-bank sectors offer a multitude of options for savers. CB is expected
to be positively correlated with M, because CB is in effect part of M. The proxies are expected to
be positively correlated with investment due to the capital accumulation theory. Table 3 shows
the averaged cross-sectional correlations between financial development and investment for the
entire sample period T. As expected all the proxies are positively correlated with INV; DGDP
shows the strongest correlation due to the fact that investment directly depends on the amount of
deposits available for investors to borrow. The correlation between CB and DGDP is positive,
possibly reflecting a greater weight from those economies further along the development
spectrum. It must be noted though that since if money growth is positive, then both CB and
DGDP are expected to display positive growth as well, and the positive correlation may be
displaying the growth of both measures.

Table 3: Correlation Between FD Proxies, FR and Investment
CB

CB
M
DGDP
FR
INV

1.0000

M
0.344656
(0.451167)*
1.0000

DGDP
0.164884
(0.455132)*
0.708602
(0.354261)*

FR

-0.37024
(0.463497)*

1.0000

*

*

1.0000

INV
0.010128
(0.441612)*
0.196427
(0.391622)*
0.209362
(0.325124)*
-0.16926
(0.410229)*
1.0000

*Correlations are not performed between FR, CB and DGDP since CB and DGDP are components of FR.
**Standard deviations in parentheses
Correlations taken over the full sample 1970-2002 for all countries in the total sample
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2. III) The Model
Using OLS on pool data has been shown in the literature to be a good way to get first
pass point estimates. Phillips and Moon (1999) and Pedroni (2000) have shown that OLS
estimators are consistent with pool data. As N (the number of cross-sectional units) increases,
however, the residual asymptotic bias increases.
The standard approach in the literature is to use a panel regression of the form:
X it = α FDit + β Z it + µ it

(1)

X represents the growth of per capita real GDP (this factor could also be a measure of the
total factor productivity growth) in country i at time t. The set of FD contains variables that
represent financial development. This set comprises of CB, DGDP and M.
Z is a vector of conditioning variables, and usually includes other factors that
theoretically affect economic growth. One of the factors in the set of Z may be the log of initial
real GDP per capita. This factor measures the convergence effect. The literature has included
such variables as the log of initial higher education enrollment as a measure of human capital, and
the population growth rate. Other factors that are sometimes included here include the inflation
rate, an export and import to real GDP ratio factor (to measure openness), etc. In the case of this
paper, the set of Z is restricted to first four and then five variables – the log of initial lagged GDP
per capita, GDP(-1), the degree of openness of the economy, OPEN, a measure of inflation, INF,
a measure of real interest rates, RI, and a dummy variable for excess money growth, DM. GDP(1) measures the convergence effect over time. OPEN (measured as the sum of foreign direct
investment (FDI) and total credit from foreign sources8) indicates that the more open an
economy, the greater the degree of economic development is expected to be, because the greater
the potential for technology transfer and technology mimicry. As mentioned earlier, decreased
openness is consistent with financial repression whereby domestic agents are restricted from
foreign borrowing and lending. A greater degree of openness is therefore indicative of a lesser
degree of financial repression. INF is the percentage change in the annual GDP deflator, and DM
is set to capture excess money growth of over 10% per annum.
A priori, the null hypothesis is for α (the coefficient on financial development) is
expected to differ depending on the proxy being used for financial development. When FD is
restricted to CB, the null hypothesis for the overall sample is that α will be negatively and
significantly related to growth (following the Chen-Fisch (1993) paper). However this null
hypothesis only holds with reference to the overall sample. (A discussion on what α is expected
to be for the different geographical regions follows shortly.) When the FD vector is restricted to
include M alone, the coefficient on α is expected to be positive for the overall sample and all
sub-samples (following the implications of the King and Levine papers). Finally, when the FD
vector is restricted to include DGDP alone, the coefficient on α is expected to be positive for the
overall sample and all subs-samples.
In this paper, the basic methodology is transformed to include a financial repression
variable, and a set of financial development variables as well as the vector of Z variables.
Equation (1) is then transformed to equation (2) below.
X it = δ FRit + α FDit + β Z it + µ it
8

Sum of lines 78bed and 78bid from the IMF’s International Financial Statistics.

(2)
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A priori, in equation 2 above, the δ variable is expected to differ in value depending on
the sample being tested (the null hypotheses for δ for the sub-samples are discussed shortly). For
the overall sample, the coefficient on δ is expected to be negative and significant following the
theoretical implications described in section 3A. The null hypotheses for α are as described for
equation 1.
Several regression results are presented. First a broad regression (equation 1) for the
entire sample period is examined to test for the overall relationship between finance and growth;
financial repression is measured by RI. Thereafter, the regression is re-run for different
geographical regions – Africa, Latin America and South-East Asia for the full sample period.
Equation 2, where FD is measured by M and financial repression is measured by FR is then run
on the broad sample and all the sub-samples.
For robustness purposes, a dummy variable is created for excess money growth (above
10% per year) in all the thirty-three countries. The sample is thus split again to test the broad
regression (including the dummy for money growth) for the different geographical areas. The
regional grouping also serves to split countries according to according to whether they classify as
“financially repressed” or “financially liberalized”. This classification based on real interest rates
is due to Pill and Pradhan (1997). On average the African countries exhibit the greatest degree of
financial repression. For further robustness checks, the time period is split into three decades to
judge whether the relationship differs according to periods of greater reform or not. The sample
is also split into two periods – pre- and post oil crisis – to see whether the relationship changes
due to the effect of a supply-side shock.

3. Results
Table 4 (Appendix 2) presents the results of eight regressions on the entire sample period,
1970-2002, for the different groups of developing countries, with and without the DM variable.
The proxy of choice in table 2 is the CB variable. The null hypothesis in regression 1 is that CB
will be negatively related to growth. When the regression is run for all 32 countries (equation 1),
the ratio of currency outside the banking system to gdp is significantly negative. The null
hypothesis is accepted. Theory suggests (as discussed earlier) that this is indicative of a poorly
developed financial system, which then translates into a poor link between savers and borrowers,
and thus decreased efficiency in the savings-investment link, leading to lower real output.
However, as discussed earlier, overall results are not indicative of differences in the different
geographical regions. Therefore the regression is then performed for the different country
groupings. The statistical behaviour of the CB ratio (as shown earlier) is that it displays a Ushape. The coefficient on CB is significant and negatively related to growth in equation 2, the
sample of African countries, (as expected), again reflecting the poor state of financial sector
development in these countries. The null hypothesis is again accepted here. In the Latin
American regression (equation 3), the variable is not significant, although it is a negative
coefficient. The null hypothesis thus cannot be accepted in the Latin American sample. SouthEast Asia (equation 4) has higher growth rates than the rest of the developing countries in this
sample, and thus it is not surprising that the ratio is significantly (at the 5% level) positively
related to growth in this region (reflecting the right hand end of the U). The South-East Asian
countries have financial systems that are better developed and offer a more diverse array of
financial instruments outside the banking sector to savers, and firms. The null hypothesis in
equation 4 is that CB will be significantly positively related to growth, and the results for
equation 4 show that CB is indeed positively and significantly related to growth here and thus the
null hypothesis is accepted here.
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Overall, the results indicate that the CB proxy does indeed fulfill the function of a measure of
financial development that can capture the changing nature of the financial sector as a result of
liberalization. The empirical evidence in Table 4 indicates that broad null hypothesis II (referred
to in section 3B) is accepted.
With reference to the RI variable, it is expected that only in the countries that are financially
repressed will the variable turn out to be significantly related to growth. The null hypothesis then
states that RI will be negatively related to growth in the African sample only. As expected, only
in African countries is the financial repression variable (RI) shown to negatively impact growth.
The coefficient on this variable is negative and significant in this sample of countries. African
countries have long experienced financial repression, which usually has been part of political
repression, and it is only recently that some African countries have begun the process of
liberalization of finance and trade. This finding echoes previous findings in the literature that
indicate the excessive regulations and distortions in the financial market negatively impact the
savings-investment link and thus negatively impact growth.
When the regressions are run with the dummy variable for excessive money growth
included (Table 4 – equation 1b, 2b, 3b and 4b), the results show that excessive money growth
negatively affects economic growth (without entering into the well-known and ongoing
discussion about the causality between money and output). Indeed, the DM variable shows a
significantly negative coefficient for all the samples (it is very close to the significance level for
the South-East Asian countries), except for Latin America. In the Latin American sample,
surprisingly, it very clearly shows a positive relationship. In Latin America, excess money
growth seems to positively affect output. Further discussion on the effects of money growth on
output differences is left for another study as the discussion best fits the money-output literature.
Theory predicts that the larger the monetary depth measure, the larger the size of the
formal financial system, and thus the higher the rate of economic growth. Since M2 contains
more developed savings instruments such as money market mutual funds and time deposits, it
would indicate that there are other options for savers besides the basic checking and savings
deposits. Mutual funds and time deposits may be offered by institutions other than the banking
system and thus a high monetary depth ratio may exist simultaneously with a high currency
outside the banking system ratio. Table 5 (Appendix 2) shows the results of the regression with
the variable in the FD vector being M representing the size of the financial sector. When the
regression is run for all countries in the sample together, the results indicate a strongly significant
positive relationship between M and growth. The null hypothesis that M will strongly positively
impact growth is accepted here. The results are less clear, however, when the region-specific
results are analyzed. In the African group, the coefficient is both positive and insignificant,
indicating that financial depth is not important in explaining growth. In the Latin American and
South East Asian groups, the coefficient is negative in sign, but insignificant. In equations 2,3
and 4 therefore, the null hypothesis that the formal size of the financial sector positively affects
growth cannot be accepted.
Table 5 also displays the results for the same regression discussed above, but with the
dummy for money growth included (equations 1b, 2b, 3b, and 4b). The results are robust to the
inclusion of the dummy – money does not seem to significantly relate to growth in all sub-sets of
the samples. The results mirror those of Table 4, in that excessive money growth is shown to
negatively impact economic growth in all the samples, except the Latin American group. The
Latin American countries thus present something of a paradox – monetary depth seems to
negatively affect growth, although the effect is very small, while excess money growth positively
affects growth. Overall the evidence does not support hypothesis 4.
In Table 6 (Appendix 2), the basic model’s FD vector in restricted to include the third
proxy for financial development, DGDP. Theory suggests that DGDP should have a positive
correlation with growth. The null hypothesis is then that DGDP will positively impact growth in
the overall sample and all sub-samples. The overall regression presents a very strong positive
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correlation between DGDP and growth (the null is accepted here). On closer observation with the
region-specific regressions, it becomes evident that this relationship is not uniform across all
regional groupings. The relationship is strongly positive in the African group of countries,
although the significance is lost when the dummy for excessive money growth is included. The
savings-investment link is a more developed one in South East Asia and so the coefficient
presents the expected positive value.
In the Latin American group of countries, the proxy displays an insignificant negative
relationship. The null hypothesis is very significantly rejected here. A possible explanation
could be related to the politico-economic and currency fluctuations within Latin America that has
led to a preference for non-local currency based assets outside the banking sector (DeGregorio
and Guidotti (1995) refer to the “extreme experiments of financial liberalization” in Latin
America during the 1970s and 1980s, which then subsequently caused economic collapses).
Regardless of the proxy for financial development being used, the dummy variable for excessive
money growth consistently reflects a negative relationship between excess money growth and
economic growth, except in Latin America. The Latin American group of countries therefore
continues to display results that are diametrically opposite to those in the other regional splits.
Table 7 (Appendix 2) presents the results for the innovative approach where FR measures
financial repression (as opposed to a more traditional measure where real interest rates proxy for
financial repression). The FR variable is run simultaneously with the monetary depth variable M,
which is used as a standard measure of the size of the formal financial sector. Recalling earlier
findings, the FR ratio progressively decreased with financial liberalization. The null hypothesis
for equations 1, 1b, 2 and 2b is that FR will be significantly and negatively related to growth.
The results strongly support the use of FR as a measure of financial repression, and
justify the importance of controlling for financial repression as well as financial development
when looking at the effect of finance on growth. FR turns out to be strongly negative in the
overall regression, and moreover it is also strongly negative in the African sample of countries,
which is more financially repressed than the other groups. The results are also robust to the
inclusion of the dummy variable for excess money growth. In equations 3, 3b, 4, and 4b the null
hypothesis changes and it is expected that FR will be positively and significantly related to
growth. However, the evidence for this null hypothesis is not strong. In both the other two
groups of countries, as expected (because they are more financially liberalized than Africa), the
coefficient turns out to have a positive (albeit insignificant) relationship with growth. In this
group of counties, there are better-developed savings channels outside the banking sector, and so
the ratio of CB to DGDP would be lower. This is then consistent with the results from the
regression analysis. Overall the evidence supports broad hypothesis VII (referred to in section
3B).

4. I) Robustness Tests
To check if the results using FR are robust, the basic regression (with FR measuring
financial repression, and M measuring financial development) is run for the overall sample and
for the three geographical regions for three different time periods; 1970-1980,1981-1990, and
1991-2002. While Latin American and South-East Asian countries were already involved in
financial reform in the 1980s (although as mentioned, the Latin American policies were more
volatile in nature), most of the Sub-Saharan countries began financial reforms under the IMF’s
Structural Adjustment Programs during the late 1980s and 1990s. At this point, it is doubtful
whether enough time series data is available to display a positive relationship between M and
economic growth in the African sample of countries. The effects of financial sector liberalization
are long-term and the relationship is expected to turn positive with time, and given consistent
economic and financial sector development.
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If the FR variable is a robust indicator of financial repression, it should display more
strongly negative results for the African sub-sample for 1970-1990, and less strongly negative
thereafter. Table 8 shows the results for the 1970-80 period. FR is very strongly negative for the
overall sample. Interestingly M is negatively related (but not significantly) to growth in the
overall sample, regardless of whether the dummy for excess money growth or not. The results for
the African sample display, as expected that FR is very strongly negatively related to growth.
The results for the Latin American and Asian groups shows that FR and M are not significant in
explaining growth, although the signs are as expected. Table 9 shows the results for the same
eight regressions but for the 1980-90 decade. Surprisingly the results show that FR is not
significant for the overall sample and for all sub-samples, regardless of whether DM is included
or not. In the final 1990-2002 decade (Table 10 in Appendix 2), FR again turns out to be
significantly negatively related to growth in both the overall and African samples. Though the
results for the FR variable are not robust to the 1980-90 decade, their saving grace is that they
seem to indicate that with financial liberalization, the ratio begins to relate less negatively to
growth (as evidenced by the overall sample and African sample results over the three decades).
There is thus only weak support for the hypothesis that FR should relate less negatively with
growth as the process of liberalization continues.
Also for robustness purposes, the sample period was split into two pre and post oil
shocks, to see whether the results change due to the effects of a supply-side shock. A supply
shock of the magnitude of the oil crisis is expected to disrupt the liberalization process due to the
massive capital outflow in response to high oil prices. In an economy with a low level of
financial development, the result of a supply-side shock is a compromised banking sector unable
to meet the demands of funds dependent on oil, and a high level of inflation that causes a greater
degree of financial repression as real interest fall drastically. Financial repression causes a
greater reluctance by economic agents to save within the banking sector, and currency looks for
other opportunities outside the banking sector.
Tables 11and 12 in Appendix 2 present the results for the regressions pre and post oil
shocks. The results show that the specification is robust to a supply side shock. The strongest
results are displayed for the entire sample and the Sub-Saharan African sample, even when the
dummy variable for excess money growth is included. As previously discussed, financial
development does not seem to be important in explaining Latin American growth.

4. II) Causality Tests
Past studies have been unable to concretely determine whether in fact, there is a financial
development and growth, and if so, in what direction. This paper has shown that a relationship
does indeed exist. This paper now discusses the causality issue using CB. M, DGDP and FR.
Recent theoretical advancements have allowed for the use of the Granger causality tests using
panel data (Hurlin and Venet, 2004). In a bivariate setting, the first variable is found to Grangercause the second variable if the forecast for the latter improves when the regression includes
lagged values of the former (Granger, 1969). In the absence of long time series information,
panel data allows the use of both cross-sectional and time series data and thus effectively
increases the degrees of freedom. There is thus a marked improvement in the effectiveness of
Granger causality tests.
Table 13 (Panels A and B) present the results of the HV Granger causality test on the
panel set for the period 1970 to 2002.
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Table 13
Causality from Economic Growth to Financial Development

1970-2002
PANEL A

EG TO CB

PANEL B
Z HNC

Z HNC

(FULL SAMPLE)

(FULL SAMPLE)

1.592093

CB TO EG

2.401736

EG TO DGDP

0.67745

DGDP TO EG

0.674353

EG TO M

0.797947

M TO EG

1.601507

EG TO FR

0.14974

FR to EG

0.85083

Z hnc is the Z statistic (see Appendix 1) for the null hypothesis of homogenous non-causality.
~ HNC

Overall Z converges weakly to a N(0,1) as follows:

Ζ N ,T N
→ N (0,1) .
→∞

Critical value is

1.96 for a N(0,1).

Interestingly, the results are most clear-cut with the CB variable as compared to the other
two proxies. When the economic growth variable is placed on the right hand side of (1), the null
hypothesis states that there is no causality from economic growth to financial development. The
results are presented in Table 13 Panel A. In this case, the null hypothesis is clearly rejected.
Growth affects finance. Economic growth does cause changes in the level of currency outside the
banking sector. It is important to understand the implications of this causality. CB is a variable
that reflects the state of financial sector development. Earlier results support the hypothesis that
as the state of financial sector liberalization improves, CB will rise again (the right hand side of
the U). Thus as economic growth improves, savings rise and the demand for new and alternate
and varied non-bank assets increases. Table 13 Panel B displays the results of the causality test
where the dependent variable is now lagged values of CB. The null hypothesis cannot be
rejected. CB cannot be shown to cause economic growth. However, these results are not
surprising considering the nature of the proxy variable, and the sample weighting. The sample is
heavily weighted towards African countries, thus since CB reflects the state of financial sector
development and if a compromised financial sector exists in an economy, CB will have a negative
relationship with economic growth and will not cause economic growth. The causality tests
therefore support the hypothesis that CB is useful in identifying the state of financial development
in an economy.
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The other proxies are also Granger tested against economic growth and in these cases,
there seems to be bi-directional causality. This finding echoes other studies which have found
that finance causes growth while growth also causes finance (for example Demetriades and
Hussein, 1996).
Causality tests are also run for FR and economic growth. A priori the expectation is that
the homogenous non-causality null hypothesis will be rejected when testing for causality running
from economic growth to financial repression. When the HV approach is used, this null
hypothesis is, surprisingly rejected, showing causality from economic growth to financial
repression. However, this can be explained when one reflects on the alternate approach when the
null hypothesis states homogenous non-causality from financial repression to economic growth –
the null hypothesis is again rejected here. Thus there is bi-directional causality between the FR
ratio (CB/DGDP) and economic growth. The bi-directional causality seems to be a result of the
nature of the FR variable. While higher ratios of CB and DGDP affect growth, higher economic
growth also causes higher CB and DGDP ratios.

5. Conclusion
The relationship between finance and growth while theoretically sound, is not
unanimously agreed upon empirically. This paper looked at the relationship between financial
development and growth while controlling for financial repression and geographical proximity.
Currency outside the banking system relative to gdp (CB), broad money relative to gdp (M), and
deposits within the banking sector relative to gdp (DGDP) are used as proxies for financial
development. CB is a unique proxy in that it explains, to some extent, why there are so many
different findings in the literature regarding the relationship between financial development and
growth. These findings are very sensitive to the choice of proxy. The standard monetary depth
measures may not be adequate in examining this relationship, because seigniorage can cause
monetary depth to increase, falsely indicating financial sector development. It is also evident that
monetary depth measures can increase in spite of the existence of financial repression, which
indicates a paradoxical state of existence for an economy. CB reflects the development of the
financial sector given the knowledge of the liberalization of the financial sector and the degree of
financial repression. The results show that CB is related negatively to growth in the less
liberalized developing countries and positively in the more liberalized developing countries.
Past studies have attempted to class countries on income levels, but the results in this
paper indicate that even within developing countries, geographical (as well as socio-economic)
proximity seems to be a factor in whether the relationship between financial development and
growth differ. This finding has a very important implication in terms of development strategy. If
countries that are close together are financially repressed, financial liberalization may not work to
promote growth if the surrounding countries (especially the trading partners) are not financially
liberalized as well. For example, land-locked countries rely on their partners with seaports for
trade purposes. If the land-locked countries engage in liberalization, both financial and
otherwise, but the neighbouring seaport country does not, liberalization may not impact growth
significantly. Needless to say, financial development must be part and parcel of a more
comprehensive development package that targets all aspects of economic growth.
Finally the choice of proxy is vitally important in determining causality. The literature is
not clear in the exact relationship between financial development and growth – it seems evident
that the choice of proxy is a critical matter in answering this question. Currency outside the
banking sector seems to be the strongest proxy in terms of causality testing out of the three
proxies tested, in that it is the only one that does not show bi-directional causality when new
Granger causality tests for panel data sets are applied to the sample. Causality test, however, do
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not allow the support of either the demand-following or the supply-leading hypothesis, because
the null hypothesis of non-causality cannot be rejected. It is not surprising, however, that the
causality issue cannot be answered with the CB variable because it is in fact an inverse variable
that does not cause economic growth if it is higher in degree in financially repressed economies.
The results indicate that it is important to control for financial repression when looking at
the relationship between financial development and growth. Traditionally financial repression is
measured through the use of real interest rates. An innovative measure of financial repression
(FR) combines the use of the ratio of currency outside banks to currency inside banks relative to
gdp. In economies where there is a low level of financial sector liberalization, the ratio becomes
particularly illuminative. The results show that countries with low levels of FR relative to the
average are higher growth economies. In the African sub-sample of countries, FR is significantly
negative in relation to economic growth. Surprisingly the results for all the financial
development proxies seem to indicate that financial sector development has not been very
important in explaining Latin American growth.
Past studies have often found conflicting results in the causality between finance and
growth. This study has shown that different regions display different relationships, that reflect
differing degrees of financial sector development. Further work needs to be done to identify a
more complete measure of financial development. An ideal measure would encompass
deregulation of the financial sector, size of the financial sector, and stock market development.
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Appendix 1: Panel Granger Causality Tests

The time stationary VAR approach is adapted to a panel data context as follows. For
each individual i, there are t time periods, such that
∀t ∈ [1,T]
p

p

k =1

k =1

y it = Σ γ (k ) y i , t − k + Σ β i(k ) x i , t − k + v i, t (1)
with p ∈ N* and v i, t = α i + ε i,t are i.i.d. (0, σ ε2 ). In this case, financial development and the
growth rate of per capita gdp are in turn fitted into (1) as LHS variables. Hurlin and Venet
assume that γ (k ) and β i(k ) are constant ∀k ∈ [1, p]. It is also assumed that γ (k ) are constant for
all individual countries but that β i(k ) can differ between individual countries. This then is the
basic setting for the panel Granger causality test. The next step then involves testing the
homogenous non-causality hypothesis, which is given by:
H 0 : β i(k ) = 0 ∀i ∈ [1, N], ∀k ∈ [1, p]
H 1 : ∃(i, k ) / β i(k ) ≠ 0
The above null hypothesis states that no causal relationships exist across N. If the
alternate hypothesis is accepted, the conclusion of Granger causality can then be made. This
procedure, however, requires that variables that enter into the system be stationary.
For all three of the financial development measures, the unit root tests are significant at the 1%
level when the variables are first-differenced. Therefore, the stationary first differenced
variables, rather than the original variables, are used to conduct the Granger causality tests.
Hurlin and Venet (2004) (henceforth referred to as HV) present an innovative but simple
b
approach to a panel Granger causality test. HV use an average statistic denoted as WHNC
, which
is found as follows:
b
WHNC
= (K/N)

N

∑W
i =1

i ,T

(2)

where Wi ,T represents the individual Wald statistics associated with the test of the non-causality
hypothesis for the individual country units i = 1,…N. The authors show that under the null
hypothesis of non-causality, each individual Wald statistic converges to a chi-squared distribution
with K degrees of freedom, when T tends to infinity.
Wi ,T T
→ χ 2 ( K ) ∀i = 1,......N (3)
→∞
Using a standard Lindberg-Levy central limit theorem, the average statistic converges in
distribution when T tends to infinity. For a small T sample however, the distribution of the
individual Wald statistic is a F (K,T-2K-1). In a dynamic model, the F distribution can always be
used as an approximation of the true distribution of the individual Wald statistic for a small T
sample. Based on these approximation, HV suggest an approximated standardized test statistic
~ HNC

b
Ζ N ,T for the average Wald statistic WHNC
of the non-causality hypothesis.
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−1
N [W NHNC
,T − N ∑ E (Wi ,T )]
N

~ HNC

Ζ N ,T =

i =1

N

−1

N

∑Var (W

i ,T

i =1

(4)

)

where the first two moments of the distribution are approximated by

1
N

N

N

i =1

i =1

∑ E (Wi,T ) ≅K * ∑

(Ti − 2 K − 1)
(5)
(Ti − 2 K − 3)

and

1
N

N

N

i =1

i =1

∑ Var (Wi ,T ) ≅ 2K * ∑

(Ti − 2 K − 1) 2 * (Ti − K − 3)
(6)
(Ti − 2 K − 3) 2 * (Ti − 2 K − 5)

Overall Z converges weakly to a N(0,1).
~ HNC

Ζ N ,T N
→ N (0,1) (7)
→∞
~ HNC

If the value of the test statistic Ζ N ,T is greater than the normal corresponding critical value for
the given degrees of freedom, the homogenous non-causality hypothesis is rejected.
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Appendix 2: Table 4: Financial Development Proxy: CB

C
GDP(-1)
RI
CB
INF
OPEN
DM

Dependent variable: Growth rate of real GDP per capita (sample period 1970-2002)
All Countries
Africa
Latin America
Eq. 1
Eq. 1b
Eq. 2
Eq. 2b
Eq. 3
Eq. 3b
1.487037
1.001298
2.402840
2.497646
3.622998
3.863590
(1.201052)
(0.794060)
(4.238417)**
(4.433802)**
(4.331817)**
(4.675011)**
-0.086363
-0.080851
-0.022127
-0.020850
-0.012963
-0.001267
(1.643549)
(-1.560567)
(-0.243648)
(-0.234756)
(-0.247563)
(-0.023326)
0.000694
0.000722
0.000205
0.000164
-0.043855
-0.052442
(1.096119)
(1.107688)
(0.570795)
(0.483735)
(-1.547698)**
(-1.887966)**
-1.076274
-1.077839
-1.086889
-1.316516
-4.060607
-3.478344
(1.677605)
(-0.498092)
(-0.491527)
(-1.993393)**
(-4.280970)**
(-3.794612)**
-0.006364
-0.006512
-0.076707
-0.087384
-0.004015
-0.003707
(-2.135272)**
(2.145754)**
(-2.754965)**
(-3.165435)**
(-2.419554)**
(-2.357813)**
0.186877
0.193366
0.232551
0.235466
0.184302
0.190586
(1.071609)
(1.089477)
(3.629416)**
(3.640161)**
(2.435591)**
(2.526445)**
-1.543206
-2.489706
1.767749
(3.315909)**
(-3.987366)**
(2.021807)**

South-East Asia
Eq. 4
Eq. 4b
0.027234
0.639602
(0.007933)
(0.185950)
0.266323
0.191177
(0.448897)
(0.323917)
0.014334
0.036147
(0.342875)
(0.873085)
1.716058
1.882106
(2.163687)**
(2.375579)*
-0.028419
-0.035490
(-0.695895)
(-0.895081)
0.194032
0.233573
(0.651251)
(0.861263)
-2.343405
(-2.843786)**

Adjusted
0.03
0.04
0.06
0.09
0.03
0.05
0.05
0.09
R-squared
t-statistics in parentheses are White’s heteroskedasticity-consistent t-statistics. **t statistics significant at 1% * t-statistics significant at 5%
The dependent variable is the growth rate of real gdp per capita
GDP(-1) is the initial level of real GDP
RI is real interest rates calculated according to the Fisher Identity
CB is the ratio of currency outside the banking sector to gdp (both numerator and denominator are in nominal values)
INF is the annual rate of increase in the GDP deflator
OPEN is the sum of lines 78bed and 78 bid from the IMF’s IFS database
DM is the dummy variable for excess money growth (measured as annual rates of growth of 10% or more)
Ho: CB is significantly and negatively related to growth in eqs. 1, 1b, 2, and 2b. Ho: CB is significantly and positively related to growth in eqs. 3, 3b, 4 and 4b.
Ho: RI is significantly and negatively related to growth in equations 1, 1b, 2, and 2b. Ho: RI is significantly and positively related to growth in equations 3, 3b, 4
and 4b.
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Appendix 2: Table 5: Financial Development Proxy: M

C
GDP(-1)
RI
M
INF
OPEN
DM

Dependent variable: Growth rate of real GDP per capita (sample period 1970-2002)
All Countries
Africa
Latin America
Eq. 1
Eq. 1b
Eq. 2
Eq. 2b
Eq. 3
Eq. 3b
1.578440
0.857516
1.097327
1.330951
2.186075
2.762327
(0.959037)
(0.522489)
(1.962020)*
(2.394463)**
(2.633742)**
(3.376482)**
-0.078761
-0.073268
-0.116984
-0.102150
-0.017674
-0.002469
(-1.447729)
(-1.368622)
(-1.254001)
(-1.128735)
(-0.303524)
(-0.041562)
0.000523
0.000597
-0.027686
-0.039910
0.000199
0.000141
(0.969460)
(1.004008)
(-0.979989)
(-1.453725)
(0.572773)
(0.436297)
0.001953
-0.000910
-0.023464
-0.013700
0.021621
0.018553
(0.174695)
(-0.083315)
(-0.400281)
(-0.234294)
(2.209510)**
(2.052905)**
-0.005397
-0.005818
-0.066813
-0.080594
-0.004138
-0.003711
(-2.083833)**
(-2.095472)**
(-2.398854)**
(-2.929133)**
(-2.410565)**
(-2.306539)**
0.236599
0.226927
0.217895
0.218359
0.235007
0.234693
(1.187606)
(1.126206)
(3.652071)**
(3.656869)**
(3.013396)**
(2.955254)**
-1.473281
-2.761851
1.747466
(-3.131815)**
(-4.263707)**
(1.978409)*

South-East Asia
Eq. 4
Eq. 4b
-4.471848
-4.086026
(-)
(-1.025948)
1.207814
1.186918
(1.520176)
(1.659666)
0.025053
0.035939
(0.937132)
(0.80053)
0.019234
-0.013934
(0.937132)
(-0.654882)
-0.035703
-0.039782
(-0.793163)
(-0.886310)
-0.947164
-0.801312
(-1.298190)
(-1.157026)
-1.313294
(-1.767505)

Adjusted
0.03
0.04
0.04
0.08
0.06
0.08
0.06
0.08
R-squared
t-statistics in parentheses are White’s heteroskedasticity-consistent t-statistics. **t statistics significant at 1% * t-statistics significant at 5%
The dependent variable is the growth rate of real gdp per capita
GDP(-1) is the initial level of real GDP
RI is real interest rates calculated according to the Fisher Identity
M is the ratio of M2 to gdp (both numerator and denominator are in nominal values)
INF is the annual rate of increase in the GDP deflator
OPEN is the sum of lines 78bed and 78 bid from the IMF’s IFS database
DM is the dummy variable for excess money growth (measured as annual rates of growth of 10% or more)
Ho: M is significantly and positively related to growth in all equations.
Ho: RI is significantly and negatively related to growth in equations 1, 1b, 2, and 2b. Ho: RI is significantly and positively related to growth in equations 3, 3b, 4
and 4b.
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Appendix 2: Table 6: Financial Development Proxy: DGDP
Dependent variable: Growth rate of real GDP per capita (sample period 1970-2002)
All Countries
Africa
Latin America
C
GDP(-1)
RI
DGDP
INF
OPEN
DM

0.636714
(1.241928)
-0.064303
(-1.211474)
0.000530
(0.964697)
4.235514
(3.859902)**
-0.005533
(-2.101259)**
0.198033
(3.487750)**

0.936228
(1.808273)
-0.061765
(-1.169097)
0.000602
(0.999707)
3.547707
(3.498062)**
-0.005923
(-2.112104)**
0.201842
(3.540653)**
-1.356186
(-2.891030)**

1.209627
(1.561390)
-0.084639
(-0.916133)
-0.027878
(-0.996244)
3.995771
(2.931631)**
-0.065753
(-2.393286)**
0.219762
(2.953599)**

1.906548
(2.522122)**
-0.076104
(-0.849309)
-0.039414
(-1.447283)*
3.090618
(2.336447)**
-0.078830
(-2.900402)**
0.222280
(2.921568)**
-2.638875
(-4.118925)**

2.539142
(1.721417)
-0.038331
(-0.643008)
0.000205
(0.619666)
-6.197412
(-1.265309)
-0.004085
(-2.617976)**
0.265529
(1.454114)

1.551427
(1.038724)
-0.017261
(-0.282304)
0.000150
(0.479863)
-4.003871
(-0.820124)
-0.003718
(-2.502373)**
0.247526
(1.339211)
1.610828
(1.813922)

South-East Asia
-4.301630
(-0.978343)
1.194265
(1.435496)
0.020300
(0.479035)
2.2126635
(0.929172)
-0.040323
(-0.930369)
-0.945962
(-1.323640)

-4.041315
(-0.918312)
1.199878
(1.447809)
0.032448
(0.744155)
1.338871
(0.586651)
-0.043319
(-1.005860)
-0.791210
(-1.184242)
-1.295045
(-1.816502)**

Adjusted
0.04
0.05
0.05
0.08
0.06
0.08
0.06
0.10
R-squared
t-statistics in parentheses are White’s heteroskedasticity-consistent t-statistics. **t statistics significant at 1% * t-statistics significant at 5%
The dependent variable is the growth rate of real gdp per capita
GDP(-1) is the initial level of real GDP
RI is real interest rates calculated according to the Fisher Identity
DGDP is the ratio of banking sector deposits to gdp (both numerator and denominator are in nominal values)
INF is the annual rate of increase in the GDP deflator
OPEN is the sum of lines 78bed and 78 bid from the IMF’s IFS database
DM is the dummy variable for excess money growth (measured as annual rates of growth of 10% or more)
Ho: DGDP is significantly and positively related to growth in all equations.
Ho: RI is significantly and negatively related to growth in equations 1, 1b, 2, and 2b. Ho: RI is significantly and positively related to growth in equations 3, 3b, 4
and 4b.
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Appendix 2: Table 7: Financial Repression Variable: FR; Financial Development Proxy: M

C
GDP(-1)
FR
M
INF
OPEN
DM

Dependent variable: Growth rate of real GDP per capita (sample period 1970-2002)
All Countries
Africa
Latin America
0.148234
-0.231335
1.568717
1.719512
2.616355
2.952499
(0.083066)
(-0.128523)
(2.535314)**
(2.787565)**
(3.080592)**
(3.522414)**
-0.023173
-0.025713
0.056253
0.034495
-0.016851
-0.002661
(-0.467828)
(-0.526762)
(0.604061)
(0.379528)
(-0.286443)
(-0.044487)
0.359880
0.285001
-0.158603
-0.136280
-0.239393
-0.195239
(1.256131)
(0.993561)
(-2.708823)**
(-2.359584)**
(-3.475372)**
(-2.860332)**
0.009156
-0.026053
-0.022919
0.004461
0.007663
0.008617
(0.911235)
(-1.930438)
(-1.721531)
(0.076646)
(0.131046)
(0.846753)
-0.004388
-0.004503
-0.050525
-0.053506
-0.003321
-0.003126
(-4.265032)**
(-4.253011)**
(-3.650035)**
(-3.888519)**
(-5.627219)**
(-5.261700)**
0.241603
0.231439
0.216454
0.219822
0.218746
0.222573
(1.204409)
(1.141297)
(3.657397)**
(3.684691)**
(2.843832)**
(2.849249)**
1.663402
-1.381757
-2.359342
(1.887061)
(-2.955714)**
(-3.814242)**

South-East Asia
-1.121635
-1.011934
(-0.300035)
(-0.274872)
0.760507
0.801135
(1.133501)
(1.233191)
0.055648
0.136621
(0.299931)
(0.693468)
-0.022557
-0.026591
(-0.865526)
(-1.045750)
-0.042895
-0.057499
(-0.959747)
(-1.288916)**
0.249325
0.286616
(-0.872533)
(1.100273)
-2.371291
(-2.912096)**

Adjusted
0.04
0.05
0.06
0.08
0.04
0.06
0.04
0.08
R-squared
t-statistics in parentheses are White’s heteroskedasticity-consistent t-statistics. **t statistics significant at 1%
The dependent variable is the growth rate of real gdp per capita
GDP(-1) is the initial level of real GDP
FR is the ratio of CB to DGDP (both numerator and denominator are in nominal values)
M is the ratio of M2 to gdp (both numerator and denominator are in nominal values)
INF is the annual rate of increase in the GDP deflator
OPEN is the sum of lines 78bed and 78 bid from the IMF’s IFS database
DM is the dummy variable for excess money growth (measured as annual rates of growth of 10% or more)
Ho: M is significantly and positively related to growth in all equations.
Ho: FR is significantly and negatively related to growth in equations 1, 1b, 2, and 2b. Ho: RI is significantly and positively related to growth in equations 3, 3b,
4 and 4b.
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Appendix 2: Table 8: Financial Repression Variable: FR; Financial Development Proxy: M
(Sample Period 1970 – 1980)

C
GDP(-1)
FR
M
INF
OPEN
DM

Dependent variable: Growth rate of real GDP per capita (sample period 1970-1980)
All Countries
Africa
Latin America
0.113675
-0.526879
5.045396
5.123756
8.327311
8.353643
(0.027225)
(-0.126129)
(2.818264)**
(2.733974)**
(3.831103)**
(3.823159)**
-0.103302
-0.115272
-0.300012
-0.326249
0.121445
0.169578
(-0.914783)
(-0.897036)
(-1.661219)
(-1.808307)
(1.018953)
(1.387617)
0.013668
-0.006252
-0.413901
-0.387375
-0.460443
-0.385471
(0.034834)
(-0.016006)
(-3.696771)**
(-3.504918)**
(-3.520719)**
(-2.876355)**
-0.045254
-0.040869
-0.076786
-0.061873
0.040339
0.026157
(-0.791719)
(-0.682915)
(-1.342261)
(-1.072580)
(0.238051)
(0.161781)
-0.017417
-0.007866
-0.008990
-0.017674
-0.095267
-0.103795
(-2.223484)
(-0.830663)
(-1.066326)
(-2.266679)**
(-2.254485)**
(-2.471168)**
0.312063
0.333458
0.515855
0.605797
0.353772
0.363612
(1.828666)
(1.842455)
(1.247132)
(1.560917)
(2.235993)**
(2.219000**
-0.855530
2.085771
-2.335281
(-1.338012)
(1.675416)
(-2.248957)**

South-East Asia
-13.26749
-13.12460
(-1.821479)
(-1.912062)**
2.461264
2.475249
(3.260820)**
(3.150017)**
0.049182
0.041571
(0.126126)
(0.110223)
0.052350
0.053731
(0.558932)
(0.551627)
0.047378
0.049380
(0.816866)
(0.775755)
-0.072442
-0.082394
(-0.138134)
(-0.154189)
0.236392
(0.180983)

Adjusted
0.08
0.09
0.15
0.17
0.04
0.09
0.16
0.16
R-squared
t-statistics in parentheses are White’s heteroskedasticity-consistent t-statistics. **t statistics significant at 1%
The dependent variable is the growth rate of real gdp per capita
GDP(-1) is the initial level of real GDP
FR is the ratio of CB to DGDP (both numerator and denominator are in nominal values)
M is the ratio of M2 to gdp (both numerator and denominator are in nominal values)
INF is the annual rate of increase in the GDP deflator
OPEN is the sum of lines 78bed and 78 bid from the IMF’s IFS database
DM is the dummy variable for excess money growth (measured as annual rates of growth of 10% or more)
Ho: M is significantly and positively related to growth in all equations.
Ho: FR is significantly and negatively related to growth in equations 1, 1b, 2, and 2b. Ho: RI is significantly and positively related to growth in equations 3, 3b,
4 and 4b.
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Appendix 2: Table 9: Financial Repression Variable: FR; Financial Development Proxy: M
(Sample Period 1981 – 1990)

C
GDP(-1)
FR
M
INF
OPEN
DM

Dependent variable: Growth rate of real GDP per capita (sample period 1981-1990)
All Countries
Africa
Latin America
-0.891531
0.751330
-0.310093
0.088751
-5.039613
-5.043517
(-0.880904)
(-0.728321)
(-0.210461)
(0.061572)
(-1.413691)
(-1.392953)
0.066888
0.056670
0.285943
0.244193
0.147732
0.131644
(0.722757)
(0.609914)
(1.292263)
(1.100496)
(1.307192)
(1.175552)
0.029742
0.070555
-0.122054
-0.061990
0.464277
0.594383
(0.272408)
(0.594892)
(-0.802228)
(-0.401740)
(0.650113)
(0.822341)
-0.009081
-0.006626
0.060868
0.068332
0.036718
0.039474
(-0.461158)
(-0.336250)
(0.623307)
(0.714024)
(2.291482)**
(2.317245)**
-0.003420
-0.003548
-0.037121
-0.042642
-0.002302
-0.002386
(-5.065660)**
(-5.064256)**
(-1.813150)**
(-2.004129)**
(-3.193365)**
(-3.278035)**
0.392780
0.398503
0.330661
0.342370
1.062832
1.126626
(1.696835)
(1.743291)
(1.302822)
(1.333937)
(2.333124)**
(2.542969)**
-1.622150
-2.108267
-2.450042
(-0.608171)
(-2.080876)**
(-2.021172)**

South-East Asia
12.97648
12.96224
(3.103343)**
(3.055211)**
-2.952711
-2.940409
(-3.003219)**
(-2.926726)**
0.556816
0.555994
(1.695928)
(1.675997)
0.184958
0.184103
(4.481832)**
(4.359496)**
-0.134388
-0.135244
(-3.114034)**
(-3.122402)**
2.669747
2.664829
(4.305904)**
(4.224067)**
-0.213488
(-0.354785)

Adjusted
0.08
0.10
0.07
0.09
0.19
0.20
0.62
0.65
R-squared
t-statistics in parentheses are White’s heteroskedasticity-consistent t-statistics. **t statistics significant at 1% *t-statistics significant at 5%
The dependent variable is the growth rate of real gdp per capita
GDP(-1) is the initial level of real GDP
FR is the ratio of CB to DGDP (both numerator and denominator are in nominal values)
M is the ratio of M2 to gdp (both numerator and denominator are in nominal values)
INF is the annual rate of increase in the GDP deflator
OPEN is the sum of lines 78bed and 78 bid from the IMF’s IFS database
DM is the dummy variable for excess money growth (measured as annual rates of growth of 10% or more)
Ho: M is significantly and positively related to growth in all equations.
Ho: FR is significantly and negatively related to growth in equations 1, 1b, 2, and 2b. Ho: RI is significantly and positively related to growth in equations 3, 3b,
4 and 4b.
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Appendix 2: Table 10: Financial Repression Variable: FR; Financial Development Proxy: M
(Sample Period 1991 – 2002)

C
GDP(-1)
FR
M
INF
OPEN
DM

Dependent variable: Growth rate of real GDP per capita (sample period 1991-2002)
All Countries
Africa
Latin America
1
1b
2
2b
3
3b
0.804313
1.035886
-0.319317
0.149573
-3.100335
-2.644706
(0.939061)
(1.268999)
(-0.262740)
(0.130193)
(-0.801495)
(-0.719923)
0.057318
0.058396
0.260865
0.251137
-0.111340
-0.077767
(0.760557)
(0.768300)
(1.747940)
(1.740401)
(-1.422847)
(-0.955725)
-0.175649
-0.160447
1.108383
0.584063
-0.255099
-0.232452
(-1.828064)
(-1.735695)
(1.453407)
(0.872119)
(-2.211379)**
(-2.048807)**
0.011508
0.009761
-0.007494
-0.007168
0.111966
0.110379
(0.884304)
(0.796442)
(-0.479371)
(-0.476188)
(1.038955)
(1.041040)
-0.143034
-0.030198
-0.035392
-0.036729
0.011985
0.010919
(-1.720979)
(-1.706563)
(-1.718452)
(-1.842284)
(0.379787)
(0.388562)
0.128949
0.169634
0.052496
0.128355
0.127187
0.136324
(1.318335)
(0.478073)
(0.152685)
(2.367374)**
(2.490376)**
(2.276413)**
-1.413347
-2.427793
2.688793
(-1.858775)
(-2.225852)**
(2.531275)

South-East Asia
4
4b
-3.512619
-4.531404
(-0.553781)
(-0.728054)
1.742451
1.925423
(1.333611)
(1.594486)
0.885579
0.864292
(2.451942)**
(2.445016)**
-0.080643
-0.083644
(-1.944648)
(-2.336043)**
-0.391799
-0.353223
(-2.805478)**
(-2.753966)**
-0.051136
0.073502
(-0.127370)
(0.209352)
-3.141005
(-2.267492)**

Adjusted
0.05
0.06
0.06
0.09
0.05
0.10
0.17
0.24
R-squared
t-statistics in parentheses are White’s heteroskedasticity-consistent t-statistics. **t statistics significant at 1% *t-statistics significant at 5%
The dependent variable is the growth rate of real gdp per capita
GDP(-1) is the initial level of real GDP
FR is the ratio of CB to DGDP (both numerator and denominator are in nominal values)
M is the ratio of M2 to gdp (both numerator and denominator are in nominal values)
INF is the annual rate of increase in the GDP deflator
OPEN is the sum of lines 78bed and 78 bid from the IMF’s IFS database
DM is the dummy variable for excess money growth (measured as annual rates of growth of 10% or more)
Ho: M is significantly and positively related to growth in all equations.
Ho: FR is significantly and negatively related to growth in equations 1, 1b, 2, and 2b. Ho: RI is significantly and positively related to growth in equations 3, 3b,
4 and 4b.
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Appendix 2: Table 11: Financial Repression Variable: FR; Financial Development Proxy: M
(Sample Period 1970 – 1978)

C
GDP(-1)
FR
M
INF
OPEN
DM

Dependent variable: Growth rate of real GDP per capita (sample period 1970-1978)
All Countries
Africa
Latin America
1
1b
2
2b
3
3b
3.791864
7.025788
-2.212883
-2.362893
3.900049
7.108881
(1.951496)
(2.966335)
(-0.500946)
(-0.535395)
(2.039269)**
(3.057449)**
0.002029
0.004413
-0.094294
-0.130931
0.165352
0.201930
(0.020835)
(0.044114)
(-0.603320)
(-0.799662)
(1.409825)
(1.689823)
0.183281
0.158690
-0.340327
-0.299229
-0.434521
-0.343519
(0.414882)
(0.352923)
(-3.167335)**
(-2.742175)**
(-3.244185)**
(-2.390698)**
-0.022338
-0.013847
-0.078123
-0.056744
0.119523
0.090038
(-0.410327)
(-0.252687)
(-1.121132)
(-0.797140)
(0.665624)
(0.525726)
-0.019058
-0.087197
-0.008813
-0.010418
-0.019727
-0.093640
(-2.612949)
(-1.882460)
(-1.107003)
(-1.543864)
(-2.679510)**
(-2.089946)**
0.380963
0.391670
0.267722
0.330520
0.219374
0.293981
(1.379717)
(1.393849)
(0.850026)
(0.992682)
(0.532934)
(0.738824)
-1.392118
1.655517
-2.705777
(-1.879270)
(1.271353)
(-2.451889)**

South-East Asia
4
4b
-19.73487
-19.64656
(-2.260050)**
(-2.151328)**
3.625659
3.626426
(3.454344)**
(3.417184)**
0.062308
0.065204
(0.151925)
(0.158583)
0.078080
0.076423
(0.749482)
(0.689479)
0.062858
0.060857
(1.014226)
(0.886571)
-0.647553
-0.645835
(-1.026816)
(-1.018350)
-0.218533
(-0.151515)

Adjusted
0.04
0.05
0.07
0.09
0.04
0.05
0.20
0.19
R-squared
t-statistics in parentheses are White’s heteroskedasticity-consistent t-statistics. **t statistics significant at 1%
The dependent variable is the growth rate of real gdp per capita
GDP(-1) is the initial level of real GDP
FR is the ratio of CB to DGDP (both numerator and denominator are in nominal values)
M is the ratio of M2 to gdp (both numerator and denominator are in nominal values)
INF is the annual rate of increase in the GDP deflator
OPEN is the sum of lines 78bed and 78 bid from the IMF’s IFS database
DM is the dummy variable for excess money growth (measured as annual rates of growth of 10% or more)
Ho: M is significantly and positively related to growth in all equations.
Ho: FR is significantly and negatively related to growth in equations 1, 1b, 2, and 2b. Ho: RI is significantly and positively related to growth in equations 3, 3b,
4 and 4b.
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Appendix 2: Table 12: Financial Repression Variable: FR; Financial Development Proxy: M
(Sample Period 1979 – 2002)

C
GDP(-1)
FR
M
INF
OPEN
DM

Dependent variable: Growth rate of real GDP per capita (sample period 1979-2002))
All Countries
Africa
Latin America
1
1b
2
2b
3
3b
0.445969
0.632238
0.715837
1.099134
-0.708095
-0.828094
(0.671958)
(0.965315)
(0.777964)
(1.231649)
(-0.297890)
(-0.352323)
0.021221
0.020226
0.164964
0.155259
-0.049249
-0.032586
(0.363434)
(0.351623)
(1.389365)
(1.338770)
(-0.744694)
(-0.493821)
-0.114917
0.566709
0.426818
-0.132446
-0.219226
-0.191198
(-1.551530)
(1.201677)
(0.932494)
(-1.754733)**
(-2.446983)**
(2.174164)**
0.019850
-0.010031
-0.009899
0.013327
0.014667
0.020121
(2.003755)**
(-0.852882)
(-0.851493)
(0.200341)
(0.219165)
(1.997050)*
-0.003815
-0.003960
-0.039697
-0.042748
-0.003087
-0.002919
(-4.636283)**
(-4.597145)**
(-2.784845)**
(-3.023324)**
(-5.260851)**
(-4.988166)**
0.385596
0.350659
0.222104
0.225274
0.220450
0.219091
(1.514547)
(1.356288)
(3.600324)**
(3.609022)**
(2.759543)**
(2.715146)**
1.459476
-1.489313
-2.292483
(1.269431)
(-2.506270)**
(-2.999936)**

South-East Asia
4
4b
4.206242
3.785559
(1.122860)
(1.050780)
0.026353
0.165980
(0.032298)
(0.213617)
0.372458
0.430184
(1.270471)
(1.421546)
-0.023576
-0.028899
(-0.757278)
(-0.977426)
-0.207149
-0.218483
(-3.232067)**
(-3.708470)**
0.345762
0.378363
(1.128444)
(1.403944)
-2.832519
(-2.714765)**

Adjusted
0.05
0.06
0.05
0.07
0.05
0.06
0.11
0.17
R-squared
t-statistics in parentheses are White’s heteroskedasticity-consistent t-statistics. **t statistics significant at 1%
The dependent variable is the growth rate of real gdp per capita
GDP(-1) is the initial level of real GDP
FR is the ratio of CB to DGDP (both numerator and denominator are in nominal values)
M is the ratio of M2 to gdp (both numerator and denominator are in nominal values)
INF is the annual rate of increase in the GDP deflator
OPEN is the sum of lines 78bed and 78 bid from the IMF’s IFS database
DM is the dummy variable for excess money growth (measured as annual rates of growth of 10% or more)
Ho: M is significantly and positively related to growth in all equations.
Ho: FR is significantly and negatively related to growth in equations 1, 1b, 2, and 2b. Ho: RI is significantly and positively related to growth in equations 3, 3b,
4 and 4b.
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Appendix 3: Graphs Depicting the Effect of Official Dollarization on CB and FR (Cast
Study: Argentina)
CB (Sample period: 1990-2002)
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Both graphs above indicate that dollarization (start date measured as 1990 for the
beginning of the official dollarization period in Argentina, have a marked effect on CB
and FR. As expected, both variables increase dramatically after dollarization, indicating
that CB can act as a good proxy to measure excessive dollarization. Excessive
dollarization is also representative of financial repression, and the FR variable is able to
capture this effect through its dramatic increase as seen above.
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Chapter 3

The effect of financial integration on financial development and growth:
A Case Study of the European Union

While it is evident that the integration that European countries are involved in
through the European Union (EU) is beneficial in terms of labour and trade
opportunities, the effect of such integration on financial development is unclear.
This paper implements an innovative approach that examines the impact of
financial integration on financial development, and subsequently on economic
growth within a sample of EU countries. Traditionally monetary depth
measures are used to assess the size and development of the financial sector.
However due to the centralized control of monetary policy, these monetary
depth measures lose their effectiveness in assessing financial development
within the EU. This paper therefore looks at bank-based measures of financial
development in an effort to establish whether a relationship exists between
financial development and growth in the European Union countries, and if so,
whether this relationship has been affected by financial integration. The results
support the hypothesis that the benefits of economic and financial integration are
not uniform. Financial integration does not seem to have a very significant
effect on growth where financial development has been controlled for.

JEL Classification: F15, O11, O52
Today’s world is often described as the one of greater globalization and increased
economic interaction between countries. The most advanced body of economically integrated
states (the federally integrated states of the US not withstanding) in the world today is group of
members of the European Union. While it is clear that economic integration can benefit member
countries under certain circumstances, the effect of financial integration on financial development
is not clear. This paper first tries to establish whether a relationship exists between financial
integration and financial development in a specific group of European Union countries. In order
to do this, bank based measures of financial development are used. Thereafter, the study is
extended to look at the relationship between financial development and growth. The rest of this
paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a brief history of the European Union; section
3 discusses the effect of integration on financial development and presents the theory behind
financial development and its effect on growth and welfare; section 4 is the data and methodology
section; sections 5 and 6 present the results and robustness checks; section 7 concludes.
Lillian Kamal, Department of Economics, West Virginia University, P.O. Box 6025, Morgantown, WV
26506. E-mail: ltkamal@mail.wvu.edu
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1. I) A Brief History of the European Union
The European Economic Community (EEC) was founded in the late 1950s, with the basic
aim of realizing a customs union and a common agricultural market (Scheller, 2004). The
founding members were France, W. Germany, the Netherlands, Belgium, Luxembourg, and Italy.
The founding members did not at this time discuss monetary and financial integration. Moreover,
they were all members of the well-functioning Bretton Woods system. By the end of the 1960s,
the Bretton Woods system was undergoing considerable strain as a result of US Balance of
Payments (BOP) policy. Inflationary differences between the EEC countries led to several BOP
and exchange rate crises, which threatened to destroy the customs union. In 1969, the leaders of
the founding member countries met at The Hague to draw up a plan for the creation of an
economic and monetary union. The result was the Werner Report 9, which laid out plans for the
creation of an economic and monetary union in stages. In March 1979, the European Monetary
System (EMS) was launched, which introduced the European Currency Unit (ECU), which was
defined as a basket of fixed quantities of the member country currencies. The purpose of the
ECU was to act as a unit of account to denominate operations in the intervention and credit
mechanisms and as a reserve asset and a means of settlement among the member central banks.
The EMS also covered the use of monetary and economic policies and tools for the achievement
of exchange rate stability. The member countries were thus able to create a zone with increased
monetary stability and relaxed capital controls. The constraints on exchange rate aided the
member countries with high inflation problems in pursuing disinflation policies through monetary
policy.
In 1989, Jacques Delors, President of the European Council, chaired a committee that
recommended that economic and monetary union be achieved in three distinct steps:
1. Stage One would focus on completing the internal market by removing disparities
between the member countries’ economic policies.
2. Stage Two would set up the basic organs and institutions of the economic and monetary
union.
3. Stage Three would involve the irrevocable locking together of the exchange rates.
The signing of the Treaty on European Unity (often referred to as “the Maastricht Treaty” on 7
February, 1992 ushered in a new era of irreversible movement towards the economic and
monetary union (EMU). It is under this treaty that arrangements were made for the adoption of a
common currency (later referred to as the “Euro”) by January 1, 1999.
By 1992, the member countries were increased to Greece, UK, Ireland, Denmark, Spain
and Portugal. The UK, Ireland and Denmark joined in 1973; Greece joined in 1981, and Spain
and Portugal joined in 1986. In 1995, Austria, Finland and Sweden joined as well. As of 2004,
ten more countries joined – these are Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia,
Lithuania, Malta, Poland, the Slovak Republic, and Slovenia. This brought the total EU
membership to 25 countries.

9

Named for Pierre Werner, the Prime Minister of Luxembourg, who chaired the committee.
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1. II) Legislation on Banking in the European Union

Initially the Community sought to establish a compulsory regulatory framework for all
European banks. However, member states failed to agree on the content of the legislation. It was
therefore decided the banking regulation, albeit with the ultimate aim of uniformity across the
member states, would be implemented gradually. The crucial piece of regulation was The Second
Banking Directive10 of December 1989 which allowed for the mutual recognition of banking
licenses opening the way for cross-border banking operations (Hadjiemmanuil, 1996). These
cross-border operations could take place simply by banks offering services to customers across
the borders or by banks opening branches in other member countries. As long as banks had their
home country authorization, they did not need any more authorization to compete in other
member countries. Foreign banks (from other member countries) in the host country need only to
follow their home country of origin regulation. There was one caveat however. All credit
institutions within the Community had to observe a minimum of 8% of own funds to riskweighed assets. In May of 1994, the Deposit-Guarantee Directive came into effect. Under this
Directive, banks in the Community had to offer a minimum level of protection for depositors’
funds. Interestingly, the Community decided that the host country would provide the guarantee
for depositors’ funds, even if the banks were from other member countries. This discouraged the
member countries from tolerating weak foreign banks within their borders (Hadjiemmanuil,
1996).
Other studies have been carried out that have looked at changes in the structure of
European banks especially during the 1990s. An important outcome of the increased competition
between banks in the Community has been the reduction in the number of banks, primarily
through mergers and acquisitions (Ibanez and Molyneaux, 2002), resulting in an increase in the
level of concentration in domestic bank industries. Ibanez and Molyneaux also find that the
number of bank branches per capita also fell during the 1990s, except for three countries (Italy,
Spain and Ireland) where the bank branch per capita ratio continued to increase until 1998.

2. Theory
The European Union countries display a great deal of diversity in terms of the degree of
development and sophistication of financial markets (Guiso, et al., 2004). During the 1980-95
period, the ratio of stock market capitalization to gross domestic product ranged from 0.08 in
Greece to 0.76 in the United Kingdom. Similarly the ratio of bank claims to gdp ranged from 0.5
in Italy to over 1 in Sweden and the Netherlands. This diversity in financial markets is
considered an opportunity for lesser-developed financial markets, which are expected to
accelerate in development as a result of financial and economic integration. It is therefore
reasonable to expect that the lesser-developed countries among the EU group would experience
greater positive effects from financial integration.

10

The First Banking Directive was adopted in 1977 and it simply stated that if banks from one member
state wished to operate in another member country (the host country) through a branch, the branch would
eventually be exempt from the host country’s regulations. (Hadjiemmanuil, 1996)
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A study of the effect of financial development on growth in EU countries must follow a
two-stage procedure. It is first necessary to explore the effect of financial integration on financial
development, and then relate these effects to growth.

2. 1) Financial Integration and Financial Development
In the discussion that follows on the advantages of financial integration, the emphasis is
placed on the effect of financial integration on the banking system. 11 The basic argument in
favour of financial openness is that it could lead to an increase in the size and depth of domestic
financial markets and increase the degree of efficiency in financial intermediation by lowering
costs, and also reducing the excessive profits associated with cartelized markets. This then leads
to an increase in investment and improved resource allocation. Levine (1996) and Caprio and
Honohan (1999) have argued that foreign bank penetration is beneficial to an economy and has
the following effects:
• An improvement in the quality of financial services in the domestic country, by
increasing competition and allowing for the adoption of more sophisticated banking
techniques and technology (for example, more advanced risk-management systems). The
adoption of such technologies improves efficiency, by reducing the cost of acquiring
information about potential borrowers and the projects that the bank may choose to
finance. Ultimately increased efficiency leads to a lower incidence of adverse selection.
• Increased access by the domestic country to international capital, either directly or
indirectly, through parent banks.
• Increased stability of the domestic financial system (and reduced volatility of capital
flows) if savers move funds (during times of financial instability) from domestic banks to
foreign institutions (based within the domestic country), rather than engaging in
international capital flights.
It has been argued that financial integration should increase the supply of finance to less
financially developed countries in an economic grouping (Guiso, et al., 2004). Giannetti and
Ongena (2005), explain that this can occur because of two reasons. More efficient financial
intermediaries can gain a greater degree of access to financial markets in less financially
developed markets either through increased facilitation of entry, or through the ability of these
intermediaries to access proximally further markets. In both scenarios, firms in the less
financially developed markets begin to enjoy easier and more cost-efficient access to sources of
external finance in the broadly integrated area. This then has a positive effect on capital
accumulation and eventually economic growth. Following is a more detailed discussion on these
two channels of effect.
Financial integration implies that domestic financial markets begin to experience
competition from more competitive external financial agents that are within the economic
grouping but outside the boundaries of the domestic economy. This competitive pressure drives
domestic financial markets to greater efficiency and to the extent that greater efficiency drives the
demand for loanable funds, this should translate into an increased size of the financial sector in
the domestic economies (Guiso, et al., 2004). In response to the foreign banks’ competitive
pressures, the domestic financial sector then reduces interest margins and thus profits to stay
competitive (Giannetti and Ongena, 2005). This should then lead to an increased demand for
funds by firms and this will then lead to an increase in the size of the formal financial sector. It is
also expected that if boundaries on financial activity are lifted foreign more efficient financial
agents will enter the domestic markets to provide financial services and in some cases may
11

However, financial integration has been shown to affect consumption smoothing, domestic investment
and is also thought to have to effects on macroeconomic discipline. For a discussion, see Agenor (2002).
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acquire local banks or merge with local banks (Giannetti, and Ongena 2005). The entry of these
more efficient foreign agents erodes the profit margins of local banks, which must then engage in
cost-cutting ventures to stay competitive. The reduction of costs streamlines the credit process
resulting in a better flow of credit that theoretically goes on to positively impact investment and
economic growth. It is therefore reasonable to expect the ratio of bank lending to gdp to increase
as a result of financial integration.
Another positive effect of financial integration on domestic financial development occurs
through the effects of legislation on the financial sector. Often financial integration involves the
standardization of regulations on accounting standards, banking practices, bank supervision and
corporate governance. Less financially developed economies then must conform to the
regulatory standards followed by the more highly developed foreign financial markets.
Ultimately this standardization of regulation may ease the adverse selection and moral hazard
problems as the projects that are funded by financial intermediaries become subject to closer and
more accepted forms of scrutiny.

2. III) How Does an Efficient Financial System Influence Growth?
In general, the literature has presented two channels through which each of these
financial functions can affect economic growth – the capital accumulation channel and the
technological innovation channel. A financial system will alter the rate of capital accumulation
by affecting the rate of savings, or by reallocating savings among new and different capital
producing technologies. The financial system will also affect the rate of technological innovation
and through increased intermediation increase the level of investment in the economy (De
Gregorio, 1999). Overall the development of the financial system affects investment in the
following ways:
1. Improvements in the quality of investment: When financial institutions develop expertise
in the evaluation and selection of projects (control of the adverse selection and moral
hazard problems) the profitability of investment projects rises (Greenwood and
Jovanovic, 1990). Greenwood and Jovanovic develop a model in which efficient
intermediaries encourage high-yield investment and growth by pooling idiosyncratic
investment risks.
2. An increased number of long-term projects: Typically long-term projects are high-risk,
high-return projects and are found to be more productive. A liquid financial market
encourages increased savings, which finance more of these high-risk, high-return projects
(Diamond and Dybvig, 1983).
3. Portfolio Diversification: A well-developed financial system allows savers to share risks,
and thus savers may be more willing to save in riskier projects, which stimulate
specialization and allow for economies of scale (Saint-Paul, 1992, Kalemli-Ozcan, et al,
2001).
Surveys of the economic literature have found the relationship between finance and growth to
be more strongly measured for developing countries; however the relationship is still under
discussion in the case of developed countries especially when studied at the aggregate level 12
(Thiel, 2001). The European Financial Round Table (quoted in Economic and Financial

12

Firm level analyses, have however, found strong support that finance causes growth in industrial
countries (see Thiel, 2001).
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Committee, 2002) commissioned a study that suggested that due to financial integration under the
EU, growth rates could increase annually by up to 0.7%.
Recent theoretical contributions have endogenized both financial intermediation and
growth, and found bi-directional causality.13 In this kind of a framework, on the one hand,
growth stimulates higher participation in financial markets and this aids in the creation and
expansion of financial institutions. On the other hand, financial institutions become more
efficient in project selection, and thus do away with the adverse selection problem, and this
stimulates investment and growth.
Before any study on financial development can be embarked on, a key issue to address is
the choice of proxy for financial development. The terms financial development is a term that
includes several reforms in the financial system of an economy – these reforms include but are
not limited to deregulation of financial markets, development of the banking sector, removal of
government controls on interest rates and development of the stock market. It is then
understandable why researchers have experienced problems in identifying one clear indicator of
financial development.

2. IV) Measurement of Financial Development
One of the standard proxies in the literature is a form of monetary depth measure – this
could be the ratio of narrow or broad money to GDP. King and Levine (1993a,b) who wrote the
seminal papers in this area, indicate that different definitions monetary aggregates can represent
different roles of financial intermediation. Some studies have used the ratio of M1 to GDP. The
use of this measure is not without criticism though. The financial sector in an economy performs
two main functions – it provides a conduit for funds from savers to borrowers, and provides
liquidity to the economy. A high ratio of M1 to GDP indicates a high level of liquidity in the
economy, and thus a high degree of monetization. However, as DeGregorio and Guidotti (1995)
indicate, a high level of monetization may actually indicate a low level of financial development.
They provide the example of the “monetary overhang” in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet
Union where a lack of alternative assets led to a high level of money holdings in these economies.
This is also related to the analysis by Bencivenga and Smith (1991) that indicates that financial
repression may lead to an increase in the ratio of liquid assets to GDP. According to the analysis
by DeGregorio and Guidotti, a low level of monetization may actually indicate an economy
where there are many alternative assets that can serve as stores of value.
King and Levine (1993a,b) used monetary depth measures related to both M1 and M2.
Traditionally, monetary depth measures reflect the formal size of the financial sector. Under
conditions of economic integration, however, a common central bank is created. A common
central bank means that monetary policy is no longer independent. Therefore if a monetary
injection occurs, it is a decision that commonly affects all countries involved. Since monetary
policy is no longer independent, the money supply in each of these countries is determined
exogenously and may no longer be a very useful indicator of the size of the financial sector.
Moreover, as De Gregorio and Guidotti (1995) have pointed out, monetary depth
measures are more related to the ability of financial systems to provide transaction services, as
opposed to the ability of financial intermediaries to act as a link between borrowers and savers.
Therefore, this paper does not use monetary depth measures as proxies for financial development.
Some authors have experimented with using M3, which is also called liquid liabilities.14
DeGregorio and Guidotti suggest the use of the ratio of domestic credit to the private
sector to GDP as a proxy for the degree of financial intermediation. This measure is indicative of
the level of credit provided to the private sector by both the Central Bank and commercial banks.
13
14

See for example Greenwood and Jovanovic, 1990.
See for example Gelb (1989).
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It is advantageous to use this measure as a proxy for financial development, because it excludes
credit provided to the public sector, and thus more accurately captures the funds that are
channeled to the private sector. This then is one of the choice proxies in this paper.

2. V) Financial Integration and Welfare
A country’s residents can adjust their portfolios in response to income fluctuations by
buying and selling assets and lending on international credit markets, thus allowing for the
smoothing of transitory shocks. Thus the concept of international risk sharing indicates that the
similarity of shocks is not necessarily a pre-requisite for a common currency, as long as the
members of the common-currency group are financially integrated. Thus countries could share a
currency and be subjected to idiosyncratic shocks as long as they “insure” each other through
private financial markets. (Mongelli, 2002)
Two channels of international risk sharing have been identified: the insurance channel
and the credit channel (Asdrubali, et al, 1996). The insurance channel refers to countries holding
claims against the output of other countries. The credit channel refers to countries borrowing
from each other. Melitz and Zumer (1999) build on the paper by Asdrubali, et, al, (1996) by
dividing the insurance channel into insurance through income flows and through depreciation.
They find that capital gains and losses are of much greater importance for risk sharing between
EU countries than income flows. They also find that openness promotes a greater degree of
cross-ownership of resources and this is risk sharing through insurance rather than credit.
Some studies have suggested that financial integration must be very carefully managed so
that benefits outweigh costs. Obstfeld (1994) argues that access to world capital markets allows
countries to borrow in the face of adverse circumstances (thus allowing for consumption
smoothing) and that potential growth and welfare gains from international risk sharing can be
large. Obstfeld observes that if risky returns are relatively uncorrelated across countries, and
provided that a certain level of risk free assets are held to begin with, a small rise in
diversification will raise expected growth and increase national welfare. Devereaux and Smith
(1994) develop a multi-economy model of diversification and growth and show that risk
reduction associated with diversification may promote or retard growth with the outcome
depending on assumptions about intertemporal consumption substitutability and the nature of
uncertainty. It must be noted though that their model does not allow for aggregate shifts in the
global portfolio of assets. These conclusions then suggest that international financial integration
and subsequent diversification could lead to either higher or lower growth. An important quest in
the literature has therefore been to identify policy prerequisites that allow countries to enjoy the
gains of financial integration while minimizing the associated risks.
Theoretically the benefits of a diversified portfolio can be seen in the model developed by
De Gregorio (1999)15. The basis for De Gregorio’s model is the canonical case illustrated by
Lucas (1987), which displays the reduction in the volatility of consumption through financial
integration. Although the analysis by Lucas is primarily used to assess the benefits of
stabilization policy, it can also be used to show the benefits of world trade in financial assets.
This section of the literature is based on Cole and Obstfeld (1991) where it is assumed that output
shocks affect not only consumption, but also the terms of trade between two countries is a twocountry model. Cole and Obstfeld find modest gains being realized from international portfolio
diversification and this result has been offered as an explanation of the “home bias” puzzle, where
savers tend to hold assets that are domestic based as opposed to international based.
15

See Appendix A1 for a brief discussion of the model.
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It is often thought that the ultimate element of economic and financial integration is the
introduction of the single currency. Karlinger (2002) suggests that the Euro is expected to
increase competition for European banks by attracting new competitors from both inside and
outside the EU. Karlinger also suggests that a change in consumer attitudes will allow savers and
borrowers to meet directly in capital markets as opposed to banks. Evidence of this is seen in the
relative increase in corporate bond issues, with issues increasing more than 400% (European
Commission 2001). Not only did the number of bonds issued increase dramatically but the
characteristics of the bonds issued also changed. It was not unusual to find bonds of 1-billionEuro denominations, while the rating of corporate bonds issued also fell somewhat. Studies have
also found evidence that suggests that cross-border ownership of bonds increased (Field, et al,
2000).

3. Sample Selection, Data and Methodology
Since this study looks at the effects of financial integration on financial development and
thereafter on growth, an adequate number of data points are required for the periods before and
after economic integration. The data sources for this study are the IMF’s International Financial
Statistics and the World Bank’s World Development Indicators. Not enough data is available for
the pre-economic integration period from these sources for the founding members of the EU.
Therefore the six founding members are dropped from the sample. The ten countries that joined
in 2004 are dropped from the sample because not enough data is available for the post-economic
integration period. The data set is then reduced to nine countries – Austria, Denmark, Finland,
Greece, Ireland, Portugal, Spain, Sweden and the UK. Switzerland has never joined the European
Union and is thus used as a control and for the purposes of identifying a secular trend.
De Gregorio (1999) applies a unique approach where he proposes that the effect of
financial integration on financial development is the initial step to studying the effect of financial
development on growth in an economically and financially integrated group of countries. His
study however, is concentrated on developing countries. De Gregorio proposes the use of gross
capital flows as a measure of financial integration – the basic logic is that the more financial
integrated an economy, the more open it is to capital flows and so the greater the magnitude of
gross capital flows between into and out of the country. The measure used here is based on De
Gregorio’s measure, but with a slight difference. In particular, a proxy was sought after that
measured international savings and lending through the banking sector. The basic logic here is
that the more financially integrated an economy, the more its banks are open to savers from
outside the economy and the more opportunities it has for international lending. This measure of
capital flows to the domestic banking sector is hereafter referred to as CAP.16
De Gregorio (1999) finds that financial integration positively and significantly affects the
development of the financial system (which he measures through a variable called CREDIT that
is similar to DCY). De Gregorio’s other proxies of financial depth are stock market based. He
uses a variable called MCAP (value of listed shares as a fraction of GDP), and TVT (total value
of shares traded in a year relative to GDP). He finds that these depth measures are generally
positively correlated with the degree of financial integration.
Following De Gregorio and Guidotti (1995), one of the proxies chosen is the ratio of
private sector credit to GDP (hereafter identified as PCY). Total bank lending (identified
16

Line 78bhd and line 78bid in the IFS data set. These series contain all financial transactions not covered
in direct investment, portfolio investment, financial derivatives or reserve assets. Major categories within
these series are deposits and loans (Source: IMF IFS guide).
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hereafter as domestic credit relative to GDP or DCY) is also related to the functionality of the
financial sector and is therefore also used as a proxy for financial development (following De
Gregorio, 1999). DCY includes both PCY and credit extended by the banking sector to the public
sector – it is therefore expected that there will be a very high positive correlation between DCY
and PCY. Finally, a third proxy is developed that looks at the receiving end of the banking
sector. This proxy measures total deposits (checking, time and savings) within the banking
sector. This proxy is hereafter identified as DGDP. All the above proxies are in nominal values
and are measured relative to nominal gdp.
The methodology in this paper is as follows: for each country in the sample set, the above
financial development ratios are calculated for the sample period: 1950 2000. This section
includes some statistics on these ratios. OLS regressions are run for each country using two sets
of data points – one set pertaining to the period before the country joined the union and the other
set for the period after the country joined the union. These regressions serve to test whether the
relationship between financial development and growth has changed for individual countries.
The sample set of nine countries is then compared with a European country that has not joined the
union – Switzerland. Switzerland serves as a control for this experiment – since this country has
not joined the union, it becomes interesting to see whether financial development measures in
Switzerland have behaved in a manner similar to those in the other six countries.
Several panel regressions are also performed to test for overall effects. The panel
regressions serve to establish whether the general nature of the relationship between (i) financial
integration and financial development and (ii) financial development and growth was impacted by
free banking across borders. A pool dummy variable is constructed that captures the date of
accession.
Three main hypotheses are tested. First it is expected that financial integration will lead
to an increase in the size of the financial sector17. An increase in the functionality of the financial
sector should lead to an increase in the levels of DCY and PCY in the sample countries. Thus it
is expected that economic integration (and thus financial integration) will positively impact
financial development. Secondly, although, there is considerable diversity within the EU, it is
expected that financial development post-accession will positively impact growth in the sample
countries, although the magnitude of effect is certainly expected to differ. The final hypothesis is
based on De Gregorio (1999), who finds that there is no evidence of a direct effect of financial
integration on economic growth, after controlling for financial depth. He therefore concludes that
the benefits of financial integration on economic growth arise primarily through the development
of the financial system, and not through financial integration itself. The third hypothesis then is
that the same effect will show in the EU sample – the effect of financial integration on growth
will arise indirectly through the financial development channel, and not directly. This then
implies that when financial integration is controlled for when testing for the effects of financial
development on growth, the coefficient on financial integration should be insignificant.

3. 1) Data Statistics
The table below displays some summary characteristics for the proxies for before and
after accession to the EU. In order to capture the effects of EU accession and control for changes
in general trends across Western Europe, each proxy is calculated relative to the proxy measure
for Switzerland. The statistics below reflect the changes in the average values of these relative
proxies before and after the date the country joined the EU.
17

See Guiso et al. (2004) as mentioned in section 3A.
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Table 1: Averaged Proxy Measures Pre and Post Accession
Country

Denmark

Ireland

UK

Greece

Spain

Portugal

Austria

Finland

Sweden

(1973)

(1973)

(1973)

(1981)

(1986)

(1986)

(1995)

(1995)

(1995)

DCY

0.447

0.268

0.436

0.254

0.641

0.639

0.508

0.378

0.442

DCY

0.395

0.391

0.535

0.563

0.619

0.523

0.725

0.333

0.271

PCY

0.441

0.305

0.169

0.186

0.524

0.609

0.467

0.418

0.377

PCY

0.353

0.389

0.517

0.265

0.501

0.439

0.598

0.339

0.233

DGDP

0.303

0.620

0.389

0.224

0.667

0.704

0.551

0.438

0.557

DGDP

0.404

0.517

0.536

0.517

0.563

0.769

0.659

0.381

0.348

An immediate observation is that the ratios are not proximate to 1 and are in fact mostly
well below 1. This indicates that Swiss levels of domestic and private sector credit are well
above those of the EU countries within the sample. The last two rows of the table above show the
ratio of deposits to GDP. Switzerland is well known as an international savings location, and so
it is not unexpected that the values in the table are relatively low for this variable. Some of the
statistics above stand out in terms of their constancy before and after EU accession. Compared to
Switzerland, countries like Ireland, Spain, and Finland have been relatively stable in terms of the
levels of domestic credit, private sector credit and total bank lending relative to GDP. If the
ratios of financial development are taken to reflect an increasing financial sector through their
increase in magnitude, it would indicate that there is relatively little increase in the size of the
financial sectors in these three countries.
A few countries have displayed reductions in the relative values of the three proxies. For
example, Denmark, Finland and Sweden display reductions in average DCY and PCY values
before and after accession. Spain, Finland and Sweden show decreases in DGDP ratios before
and after their accession dates.
Not all the ratios are relatively constant. For the UK, for example, the ratio of private
sector credit to gdp increased more than 300% after economic integration. In Greece, the average
relative DCY ratio was 0.254 before integration, but that ratio increased to 0.563 after economic
integration. There was also a significant rise in DGDP in Greece (0.224 to 0.517).
The hypothesis that financial integration should cause an increase in the size of the
financial sector does not hold with respect to all the countries, if one is analyzing the relative
proxy values over the region. In fact, the results are rather mixed - some countries have shown
negative growth in the relative sizes of their financial sectors, while others have shown relatively
high increases.

72

Table 2: Correlations Between Proxies Post Accession

DCY
PCY
DGDP

DCY
1.0000

PCY

DGDP

0.902938

0.677971

1.0000

0.669159

1.0000

Table 2 above displays the cross-correlations for the three proxies for financial development
averaged out over the nine countries. As expected all correlations are positive and the highest
correlation is between PCY and DCY, because PCY is in fact a component of DCY.

3. II) The Model
The panel approach is first discussed here because the individual OLS regressions are
based on the general panel approach in the literature. Using OLS on pool data has been shown in
the literature to be a good way to get first pass point estimates. Phillips and Moon (1999) and
Pedroni (2000) have shown that OLS estimators are consistent with pool data. As N (the number
of cross-sectional units) increases, however, the residual asymptotic bias increases.
The standard approach in the literature is to use a panel regression of the form based on Barro
(1991):
X it = α FDit + β Z it + µ it

(1)

X represents the growth of per capita real GDP (this factor could also be a measure of the
total factor productivity growth) in country i at time t. FD is a variable that represents financial
development. This variable is consecutively set to reflect the three proxies – DCY, PCY, and
DGDP.
Z is a vector of conditioning variables, and usually includes other factors that
theoretically affect economic growth. One of the factors in the set of Z may be the log of initial
real GDP. This factor measures the convergence effect. The literature has included such
variables as the log of initial higher education enrollment as a measure of human capital, and the
population growth rate. Other factors that are sometimes included here include the inflation rate,
an export and import to real GDP ratio factor (to measure openness), etc. In the case of this
paper, the set of Z is restricted to three variables – the log of initial GDP per capita, INIT, the
degree of openness of the economy, OP, and a measure of inflation, INF. INIT measures the
convergence effect over time. OP (measured as the ratio of the sum of exports and imports to
gdp) captures the trade impact of the economic union. INF is the percentage change in the annual
GDP deflator.
Macroeconomic conditions are expected to affect the development of the financial system
(De Gregorio, 1999). Even at shorter horizons, high inflation can negatively impact the
development of the financial system because of uncertainties in future financial conditions. It is
possible though, that as a result of an inflationary environment, shorter-term instruments and
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inflation-indexed instruments could dominate the use of long-term contracts. Although the
overall net effect on the financial sector is unclear, it is expected that high inflation would shift
the focus of the financial sector towards short-maturity instruments (De Gregorio, 1999).
An open economy displays characteristics of trade openness as well as financial
integration. The purpose of including the trade variable in the above formulation is to capture the
effects of financial services involved in international transactions that may promote the
development of the financial system.
In this paper, the basic theoretical approach is run using a fixed-effects methodology to
control for country-specific effects. Equation (1) is then transformed to equation (2) below.
X it = η i + α FDit + β Z it + µ it

(2)

where η i are country-specific constants. A priori the null hypothesis is that financial
development will positively affect growth, and so the null hypothesis is that α >0. Following De
Gregorio (1999) and to isolate the effects of financial integration and financial development on
growth, the above panel approach is extended to equation 2’ below.

X it = ηi + α FDit + δ FI it + β Zit + µit

(2’)

Following De Gregorio, who shows that the effects of financial integration are indirect on growth
through the financial development channel, it is expected that δ will turn out to be insignificant
(especially since openness will already be controlled for in the Z vector) while, α >0.
Furthermore, the above equation is also extended (equation 2” below) to include a dummy
variable that controls for the date of accession for the different member countries in the sample.
The dummy variable presents a simplistic way to capture not only financial integration but also
economic integration, apart from pure openness (which is controlled for in the Z vector). If the
dummy variable captures the same effect as the financial development variable, then it is
expected a priori that γ will be insignificant.

X it = ηi + α FDit + γ Dit + β Z it + µit

(2’’)

X it = ηi + γ FI it + β Zit + µit

(2’’’)

Equation 2’’’ above includes only the financial integration variable without the financial
development proxy in place. This particular specification attempts to capture the pure effects of
financial integration on growth and relates to the third hypothesis being tested in this paper. Does
financial integration affect growth independently of the financial development? A priori, it is
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expected that γ will not be significant since the effects of financial integration are not expected to
be direct on growth, but rather should affect growth indirectly through financial development.
Finally the panel regression is run with only the financial integration variable and the
dummy variable alone as follows:

X it = ηi + δ FIit + γ Dit + β Z it + µit

(2’’’’)

If the dummy variable is successful at capturing similar effects on growth as the financial
integration variable, it is expected that it will be insignificant in both equations 2’’ and 2’’’’
above.
Following De Gregorio, a two-stage procedure is performed where first the impact of
financial integration on financial development must be examined. The basic panel formulation
above is then expanded to include the following nested regression:
FD it = ηi + δ FIit + β Z it + ν it

(3)

where FI is a measure of financial integration and Z is a set of other variables that may be thought
to affect financial development. These variables are set to be the same set of Z as in equation (3).
A priori, (following De Gregorio’s finding) it is expected that δ >0. Similar to the previous
analysis, an extended version of equation 3 above is tested – this is equation 3’ below that
explicitly includes both the CAP variable and the D variable. In equation 3’ below, it is expected
that since financial integration is expected to affect financial development positively, and if the
dummy variable is able to capture the same effects as the FI variable (when Z has controlled for
openness), γ will be insignificant.
FD it = ηi + δ FIit + γD it + β Z it + ν it

(3’)

It is expected that with a diverse group of countries such as the EU countries, a panel
regression approach may not be adequate in capturing the differences in the relationship between
FD and growth, and FI and FD. Therefore, only part of the focus of this paper is on overall panel
effects, the analysis is also extended to study the relationships within the various countries in the
sample. The basic regression is adapted to the individual country approach by transforming it
into a linear regression of the following form.

X t = α + β FDt + γ Z t + ν t

(4)

where X represents the growth rate of real GDP in country i, FD represents a measure of financial
development for country i, and Z is a set of other variables that affect growth (set to be the same
as the panel regression vector of Z).
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Similar to the panel approach, a two-stage procedure is followed where first the impact of
financial integration on financial development must be examined. The linear equation above is
then expanded to include the following nested regression

FDt = φ + δ FI t + β Z t + ν t

(5)

where FI is a measure of financial integration and Z is a set of other variables that may be thought
to affect financial development. These variables are set to be the same set of Z as in equation (8).

5. Results
Table 3 presents the results from the panel regressions on equations 2-2’’. The table is
separated into three panels by proxy for financial development. Some startling conclusions can
be made from the analysis. Financial development is always negative in effect on growth,
regardless of the proxy being used. The coefficients on the financial development proxies are
largely significant and always negative. When tested along with financial development, the
financial integration variable is always positive in effect, although insignificant. The set of
conditioning variables Z behaves as expected. Openness has a positive effect on growth and
inflation has a negative effect on growth. It is quite obvious that the dummy variable for
integration is capturing a different effect from the CAP variable. The coefficient on the dummy
is always negative, and moreover it is significant in the cases of PCY and DGDP. Thus
international savings and loans through the banking sector are not captured adequately by a
simple dummy variable and must be controlled for on their own.
The results seem to indicate that overall financial development has not benefited growth.
This may of course reflect the choice of proxy involved. However, it is more likely, as expected
that a pool analysis which may show the overall effect across a group of countries may not
adequately capture the individual country effects of financial development on growth. The EU
countries are a diverse group and financial development is expected to have a strongly positive
impact on growth in the lesser developed countries in the sample. This analysis is left for further
discussion after the results from the individual country regressions are presented.
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Table 3: Effects of financial integration and financial development on growth – panel results
1950-2000
EQUATION

DCY

PCY

DGDP

2

2’

2’’

2

2’

2’’

2

2’

2’’

12.97598

7.631544

12.69858

12.35531

6.997584

12.01269

12.87071

5.779995

12.45384

(12.89510)

(3.738175)

(12.40885)

(12.23748)

(3.565457)

(11.84052)

(12.27027)

(2.989359)

(11.77402)

-0.754897

-0.638024

-0.746017

-0.747441

-0.612165

-0.734329

-0.789890

-0.544422

-0.771205

(-7.621676)

(-4.188531)

(-7.526500)

(-7.426014)

(-4.043550)

(-7.323168)

(-7.768137)

(-3.630369)

(-7.602316)

-2.461853

-1.280368

-2.245356

-2.042639

-1.208203

-1.800420

-2.481085

-0.700690

-2.164993

(-5.528127)

(-2.076737)

(-4.782320)

(-3.915689)

(-1.774596)

(-3.405071)

(-3.754692)

(-0.817322)

(-3.229579)

C

INIT

FD
4.993629

5.324549

4.581683

(1.332958)

(1.410498)

(1.215284)

FI
-0.429030

-0.694978

-0.700010

(-1.440177)

(-2.387430)

(-2.399396)

D
1.345069

4.660182

1.682699

1.486945

4.863714

2.027283

1.563133

4.972043

2.093133

(2.419137)

(6.942954)

(2.791481)

(2.571325)

(7.386136)

(3.279482)

(2.666309)

(7.544301)

(3.356648)

-0.184377

-0.113250

-0.183304

-0.196403

-0.116417

-0.192864

-0.186864

-0.099468

-0.184544

(-8.056400)

(-4.077046)

(-8.014929)

(-8.502337)

(-4.018190)

(-8.375657)

(-7.992641)

(-3.675805)

(-7.928612)

0.25

0.29

0.26

0.23

0.29

0.24

0.23

0.28

0.23

OP

INF

Adj. R

2

FD proxies: DCY (ratio of domestic credit from banking sector to GDP); PCY (ratio of private sector credit from banks to gdp); DGDP (ratio of banking
sector deposits to GDP). All components of FD ratios are in nominal values. FI proxy: Capital flows to banks (deposits and loans)
Eq. 2: Ho: α>0 (FD positively affects growth); Eq. 6’: Ho: α>0, δ insignificant (FD positively affects growth, FI indirectly affects growth through FD); Eq.
2”: Ho: α>0, γ>0 (Dummy insignificant if capturing the same effect as FI)
Conditioning variables: openness and inflation, and convergence effects.
*t-statistics in parentheses **t-statistics significant at 5% or less for all t-stats greater than 2 in abs. value. (Dep. Variable is growth)
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Table 4 below presents the results from equations 2’’’ and 2’’’’. These equations serve to
isolate the effects of financial integration on growth without the use of the financial
development variables. Earlier results already indicate that the CAP and D variables are not
comparable in effect, and seem to be reflecting different effects on growth. The results
indicate that as in Table 3, financial integration appears to have a positive effect on growth,
but the coefficients are not significant. When the D variable is included, the magnitude of the
coefficient on CAP decreases only slightly and D is insignificant. However, interestingly
without the inclusion of the FD proxies, the D variable now registers a positive effect.

Table 4: Testing for the Effects of Integration on Growth – panel results
2’’’

2’’’’

4.828602

4.394502

(3.129867)**

(2.796329)**

-0.494046

-0.470719

(-3.616404)**

(-3.426214)**

4.548897

3.969776

(1.207531)

(1.049360)

EQUATION
C

INIT

FI
0.448568
D
(1.379840)
4.975208

4.772440

(7.554712)**

(7.086153)**

-0.095817

-0.088464

(-3.592745)**

(-3.258893)**

0.28

0.29

OPENNESS

INFLATION

Adj. R

2

FI proxy: Capital flows to banks (deposits and loans)
Ho: δ insignificant (FI affects growth indirectly through FD); Ho: γ insignificant (Dummy
insignificant if capturing the same effect as FI).
Conditioning variables: openness and inflation, and convergence effects.
*t-statistics in parentheses **t-statistics significant at 5% or less.
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Table 5: Testing for the effects of financial integration on financial development – panel results
1950-2000
EQUATION

DCY

PCY

DGDP

3

3’

3

3’

3

3’

2.189169

2.225052

1.795213

1.896579

1.357796

1.399179

(13.33441)

(13.28282)

(12.04501)

(12.75262)

(11.40969)

(11.56765)

-0.112450

-0.114379

-0.097765

-0.103212

-0.071895

-0.074118

(-7.735001)

(-7.810313)

(-7.407614)

(-7.938356)

(-6.822450)

(-7.009236)

0.347347

0.395217

0.641988

0.777218

0.046791

0.101999

(0.866454)

(0.980089)

(1.764029)

(2.170956)

(0.161024)

(0.350307)

C

INIT

FI
-0.037078

-0.104745

-0.042762

(-1.070022)

(-3.404728)

(-1.709054)

D
OPEN-

-0.246043

-0.229283

-0.092281

-0.044933

-0.004517

0.014813

NESS

(-3.510814)

(-3.193836)

(-1.450462)

(-0.704994)

(-0.088921)

(0.285762)

INFLA-

-0.013616

-0.014224

-0.017050

-0.018767

-0.005210

-0.005911

TION

(-4.797577)

(-4.915771)

(-6.617475)

(-7.305476)

(-2.532631)

(-2.829257)

0.24

0.25

0.24

0.28

0.17

0.18

Adj. R

2

FI proxy: Capital flows to banks (deposits and loans)
Ho: δ>0 (FI positively affects FD); Ho: γ insignificant (Dummy insignificant if capturing the same effects
as FI).
Conditioning variables: openness and inflation, and convergence effects.
*t-statistics significant at 5% or less. Dep. Variable is fd

Table 5 above displays the results of the nested regressions 3 and 3’. The purpose of the
exercise was to capture the interaction between financial integration and financial development.
The CAP variable is always positive indicating that financial integration has a positive effect on
financial development. When the dummy in included in formulation 3’, the CAP variable is
significantly positive in its effect on PCY. The conditioning variable for openness is negatively
in its effect on FD – this may be indicative of trade-related financial transactions that do not have
beneficial effects on the banking sectors of the pool group. The above panel results (Table 3-5)
paint an overwhelmingly negative role for financial development in explaining growth. It would
not be surprising for this analysis to change when the focus changes to country-specific studies.

79

Table 6: Financial Integration and Financial Development Post Accession
Financial Integration and Financial Development

DCY
PCY
DGDP

DENMARK
Post-1975
0.336622
(0.469142)
0.41
0.555998
(0.602939)
0.10
-0.666800
(-2.915178)**
0.86

GREECE
Post 1981
0.612872
(0.550544)
0.13
0.380125
(1.162105)
0.79
-0.247658
(-0.412156)
0.02

IRELAND
Post-1975
0.471068
(1.083989)
0.73
0.291879
(1.121463)
0.88
-0.055221
(-0.217646)
0.81

PORTUGAL
Post-1986
1.616718
(1.887884)
0.28
2.052962
(1.894507)
0.54
0.362501
(1.207679)
0.56

SPAIN
Post-1986
0.583038
(3.095325)**
0.35
0.456659
(1.300830)
0.25
-0.199358
(-1.164067)
0.45

UK
Post-1975
0.443225
(0.601513)
0.89
0.394515
(0.575560)
0.92
-0.353375
(-0.543729)
0.84

*t-statistics significant at 5% or less. Adjusted R-squared values below t-stats. Dep. Variable is FD. Ho: FI significant in explaining
FD

Table 6 above shows the results of regressing the financial integration variable (CAP) on the
financial development indicators after the member countries joined the EU. Several findings
are immediately apparent. Only in two cases, is financial integration important in explaining
the path of financial development. Financial integration has a significantly negative effect on
DGDP in Denmark, and it has a significantly positive effect on financial development in
Spain. It is also very interesting to note that in five out of the six countries in Table 6, CAP
has a negative relationship with DGDP (significant only in Denmark). These results become
doubly interesting when compared with the results when financial development is
subsequently regressed on growth.
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Table 7
This table shows the results of the OLS regressions on each of the six countries.

Linear regressions coefficients for financial development proxies (European Union
countries based on date of accession)

AUSTRIA

DCY

PCY

DGDP

Pre and post 1995

Pre and post 1995

Pre and post 1995

-9.412940
(-2.436934)**
0.25

-27.94826
(-0.318484)
0.09

Pre and post 1973
DENMARK

-5.427312
(-0.221548)
0.18

2.019721
(0.784835)
0.24

Pre and post 1995
FINLAND

-23.18395
(-3.311204)**
0.33

36.83252
(3.558947)**
0.93

Pre and post 1981
GREECE

4.121551
(0.613698)
0.32

-4.226907
(-0.697950)
0.21

Pre and post 1973
IRELAND

11.04068
(0.988393)
0.12

-0.290925
(-0.049587)
0.35

Pre and post 1986
PORTUGAL

-9.333515
(-1.356582)
0.45

4.090554
(1.619589)
0.88

Pre and post 1986
SPAIN

5.695366
(0.836322)
0.63

32.96219
(4.046620)**
0.71

Pre and post 1995
SWEDEN

8.388829
(1.330757)
0.49

-227.46
(-1.928767)
0.51

Pre and post 1972
UK

5.456761
(0.904903)
0.19

2.033609
(0.791264)
0.43

-15.82831
(-2.692623)**
0.27

-18.75111
(-0.952870)
0.07

Pre and post 1973
-13.19634
(-0.601038)
0.36

1.523668
(0.761510)
0.24

Pre and post 1995
-20.43890
(-2.556896)**
0.27

55.16419
(2.830417)**
0.90

Pre and post 1981
7.048049
(0.707305)
0.33

14.84755
(0.746299)
0.21

Pre and post 1973
16.03686
(0.872708)
0.13

18.19216
(2.392245)**
0.48

Pre and post 1986
-14.97463
(-2.207243)**
0.50

3.183408
(1.590479)
0.88

Pre and post 1986
10.00614
(1.909154)
0.66

15.77499
(2.045231)**
0.46

Pre and post 1995
0.791696
(0.114246)
0.44

56.03993
(0.292495)
0.12

Pre and post 1972
2.622471
(0.476300)
0.13

3.059806
(0.852587)
0.34

-12.56564
(-2.295781)**
0.23

289.1119
(1.934169)
0.29

Pre and post 1973
-1.008557
(-0.025842)
0.15

-18.71513
(-3.264076)**
0.47

Pre and post 1995
-10.00599
(-0.682867)
0.15

34.93613
(0.932001)
0.50

Pre and post 1981
8.231232
(0.818104)
0.33

12.73417
(1.161000)
0.25

Pre and post 1973
5.559172
(0.373449)
0.17

18.65874
(3.140483)**
0.55

Pre and post 1986
3.497179
(0.602960)
0.43

12.21523
(1.543078)
0.88

Pre and post 1986
8.400014
(1.907078)
0.66

-37.61560
(-2.515769)**
0.53

Pre and post 1995
-0.562267
(-0.054189)
0.44

-57.43373
(-0.206592)
0.21

Pre and post 1972
9.971583
(1.285992)
0.04

4.926900
(1.626751)
0.39

*t-statistics in parentheses **t-statistics significant at the 5% level or less. Adjusted R-squared values below t-stats. Dependent
variable is growth rate of real GDP for each country. Ho: FD significant in explaining growth.
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The main aim of the exercise in Table 7 is to illuminate the relationship between financial
development and growth before and after accession to the EU. For this reason, the regressions
are run for the period before and after the member country’s accession to the EU. Several
features stand out as a result of this exercise. In three cases (Greece, Sweden and the UK),
financial development is not significant in explaining economic growth. It is more interesting,
however, to study the sign on the coefficient on financial development before and after accession.
The immediate finding is that in all the countries except the UK, there is a reversal in the sign of
the coefficient in at least one of the proxies. For Finland, there is a very strong reversal of the
coefficients on DCY and PCY, indicating that only after accession to the EU, did the credit
process contributed positively to growth. Table 15 in the appendix shows the average growth
rates for OECD countries over the period 1991-2003. Ireland has experienced the highest growth
rates. Table 4 shows that the relationship between financial development and growth in Ireland is
overwhelmingly significant and positive (DCY and DGDP) post-accession. The table also shows
that before accession to the EU, Portugal had a resoundingly negative relationship between
private sector credit and growth. Post 1986 this relationship although not significant becomes
positive.
When Tables 6 and 7 are compared some very interesting conclusions can be made.
Denmark shows a significantly negative relationship between financial integration and growth
(after accession to the EU) when the link is studied through financial development. CAP has a
significantly negative relationship with DGDP, and subsequently DGDP has a significantly
negative relationship with the growth rate of real GDP. Spain on the other hand, displays a
significant positive relationship between financial integration and growth through financial
development. CAP has a significant positive relationship with DCY, and subsequently DCY has
a significant positive relationship with the growth rate of real GDP. Although not significant,
CAP has a negative relationship with DGDP, which then subsequently has a significant negative
relationship with the growth rate of real GDP. Referring to Table 7, Spain shows an
overwhelmingly positive relationship between financial development and growth: the coefficient
signs on DCY and PCY are significant and positive.

Table 8: Panel Regressions Before and after Second Banking Directive

PANEL
REGRESSION
WITH ALL
SAMPLE
MEMBERS
EXCEPT 1995
MEMBERS

DCY

PCY

Pre and post 1989

Pre and post 1989

-2.907400
(-1.975748)
0.37

0.089571
(0.055570)
0.36

-0.420788
(-0.234864)
0.66

DGDP

-0.479220
(-0.309137)
0.66

Pre and post 1989
-12.56564
(-2.295781)**
0.23

289.1119
(1.934169)
0.29

t-statistics in parentheses. **t-statistics significant at 5% or less. Adjusted R-squared values below t-stats. Dependent variable is
growth rate of real GDP for each country. Ho: FD significant in explaining growth.
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For the purposes of an overview of the robustness of the relationship between financial
development and growth over the member countries in the sample that qualify, a panel regression
was run on the period before and after 1989 (when the Second Banking Directive was
implemented). The results (shown above in Table 8) indicate that all proxies for financial
development register a negative relationship with growth after the institution of the Second
Banking Directive. (These results mirror the results in Table 3 that show that financial
development does not seem to benefit growth in the EU sample.) Moreover, there is a significant
negative relationship between DGDP and economic growth. While this result is interesting it
does not clarify the relationship. In order to see whether this relationship holds for all the
countries across the sample, individual regressions are performed and the results are presented in
Table 9 below.

Table 9

Linear regressions coefficients for financial development proxies (European Union
countries based on Second Banking Directive)

DENMARK

DCY

PCY

DGDP

Pre and post 1989

Pre and post 1989

Pre and post 1989

-8.013725
(-8.015513)
0.35

-3.196521
(-0.451050)
0.07

Pre and post 1989
GREECE

0.838059
(0.207814)
0.53

-12.94277
(-2.777187)**
0.74

Pre and post 1989
IRELAND

-6.873298
(-1.066667)
0.06

21.71970
(2.608062)**
0.72

Pre and post 1989
PORTUGAL

-7.818762
(-1.281666)
0.46

-0.921854
(0.096532)
0.79

Pre and post 1989
SPAIN

9.651445
(1.515739)
0.60

15.63821
(2.624414)**
0.90

Pre and post 1989
UK

2.952366
(1.298475)
0.30

-18.26996
(-1.104231)
0.63

-2.598929
(-0.222638)
0.37

-3.799983
(-0.726388)
0.03

Pre and post 1989
7.378897
(0.835530)
0.53

18.03245
0.760889
0.49

Pre and post 1989
0.021898
(0.001417)
0.10

21.27247
(2.444901)**
0.70)

Pre and post 1989
-5.917097
(-1.300486)
0.46

-0.475273
(-0.072478)
0.79

Pre and post 1989
9.698833
(1.890698)
0.61

5.361210
(1.152722)
0.84

Pre and post 1989
3.259002
(1.349702)
0.30

-6.671244
(-0.501594)
0.58

-16.90822
(-1.938709)
0.40

-40.09909
(-3.009733)**
0.52

Pre and post 1989
3.518014
(0.557259)
0.53

7.726984
(0.426670)
0.46

Pre and post 1989
11.73246
(1.214199)
0.05

16.25064
(1.022712)
0.52

Pre and post 1989
3.457533
(0.627100)
0.44

8.488066
(0.429898)
0.79

Pre and post 1989
7.195187
(1.581969)
0.60

-5.589353
(-0.455833)
0.81

Pre and post 1989
3.260397
(1.199726)
0.29

9.971277
(1.749731)
0.70

*t-statistics in parentheses **t-statistics significant at the 5% level. Adjusted R-squared values below t-stats. Dependent variable is
growth rate of real GDP for each country.
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Table 9 provides some interesting insights into the relationship between financial
development and growth before and after the Second Banking Directive. The regressions are
performed only for the six countries that were already members before 1989. In Denmark’s case,
financial development displays an overwhelmingly negative relationship with growth regardless
of the time period being studied. Both after joining the EU and after 1989, the relationship
between DGDP and growth is significantly negative. In Table 7, the financial development
proxies are not significant for Greece before and after 1981 when it joined the EU. Table 9
makes this relationship a little clearer. Post-1989, the relationship between DCY and growth is
resoundingly negative for Greece. Table 7 shows that PCY and DGDP are significant and
positive for Ireland in the post-1973 period. The results are robust for post-1989 period, and
DCY is now also positive and significant. Spain displays an overwhelmingly positive
relationship between the proxies and growth rates, and the results are robust to the post 1989
period. Overall, then for the six countries in the second sample, Denmark displays the most
overwhelmingly negative relationship between financial development and growth, regardless of
the proxy chosen.
Post-1989, DCY and PCY have a negative relationship with growth in the UK. As
discussed earlier, financial integration has a negative effect on financial development in the UK
post-1989. Table 10 below shows that the average net capital inflow into the UK is positive.
Table 1 showed that PCY has increased on average over 400% in the UK. It seems then that
financial integration and financial development have a negative effect on growth in the UK,
because net capital flows are positive at 3% of GDP, domestic credit and private sector credit are
not being channeled to investment in the UK, but instead finance projects outside of the UK. The
UK is then acting as a net lender of funds in the EU.
Table 10
Country

Average net funds flow to
banking sector (19912000) as a fraction of GDP

Denmark
Greece
Ireland
Portugal
Spain
UK
Switzerland*

-0.00445398
0.026346
-0.03787
0.03029532
0.006365653
0.032828
0.00481347

*Switzerland acts as a control
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6. Robustness
In addition to the analysis in Table 8 in section 5, two main robustness checks are
performed. The analysis of financial integration on financial development is carried out postSecond-Banking-Directive to see if the results change. Secondly, structural break tests are
performed to test for structural breaks in the financial development proxies at the time of
accession to the EU.

Table 11: Results of Linear Regressions of Financial Integration on Financial
Development
Financial Integration and Financial Development

DCY
PCY
DGDP

DENMARK
Post-1989

GREECE
Post 1989

IRELAND
Post-1989

PORTUGAL
Post-1989

SPAIN
Post-1989

UK
Post-1989

-0.832592
(-1.642368)
0.92
-1.134791
(-1.708307)
0.89
-0.340766
(-2.015082)**
0.57

1.804018
(1.731917)
0.03
0.329867
(1.038948)
0.88
0.116681
(0.256042)
0.43

0.239078
(0.532604)
0.83
0.221237
(0.498086)
0.85
-0.034735
(-0.110606)
0.89

0.130334
(0.250565)
0.89
-0.021868
(-0.028733)
0.90
0.083853
(0.338685)
0.88

0.448409
(2.085401)**
0.38
0.286612
(0.651679)
0.31
-0.027235
(-0.147701)
0.59

-0.191458
(-1.288916)
0.87
-0.047865
(-0.219480)
0.78
-0.263801
(-0.625169)
0.88

*t-statistics in parentheses **t-statistics significant at 5% or less. Adjusted R-squared values below t-stats. Dependent variable is FD.

Table 11 displays the results of the robustness check on the relationship between CAP
and the proxies for financial development. The results indicate that the relationships are robust to
the Second Banking Directive.
Chow tests are performed to see whether structural tests occur during two key dates – the
date of accession to the European Union and the date of the Second Banking Directive. In order
to remove the secular trend across the entire EU, the average of each proxy is taken across the
sample period for all countries in the sample and including Switzerland, and then this average is
subtracted from the proxy series for each country. Tables 12 to 14 present the Chow tests results
for the three proxies for each of the countries in the sample, and are in the appendix. In the case
of the three countries that joined in 1995, Chow tests are not carried out for 1989.
Austria, Finland and Portugal show evidence of structural breaks occurring at the time of
accession regardless of the financial proxy tested. Denmark, Ireland, Spain and the UK do not
show evidence of structural breaks with any of the proxies tested.
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7. Conclusion
Many studies look at the relationship between financial development and growth. Some
of the current issues in this literature include the choice of proxy and the causality between
financial development and growth. This paper looks at the relationship from a European Union
perspective, and in an innovative approach, considers the effect of financial integration on growth
through the financial development channel in a comparative study across a sample of EU
countries.
The basic approach follows that of De Gregorio, in that the study follows a two-stage
procedure. First the effect of financial integration on financial development is assessed, and
thereafter the effect of financial development on growth is assessed. Three financial development
proxies are chosen and tested – the ratio of domestic credit provided by the local banking sector
to GDP, the ratio of private sector credit provided by the local banking sector to GDP, and the
ratio of domestic deposits in the domestic banking sector to GDP. Financial integration is
measured as the net flows of funds to the banking sector in the form of deposits and currency
relative to GDP.
The paper finds several interesting conclusions, and highlights several puzzles that beg
further study. Financial integration does not seem to lead to a general overall increase in the
relative size of the financial sector. Secondly, while panel regressions display an overwhelmingly
negative effect of financial development on growth, this result changes somewhat when the
analysis is country-focused. The relationship between financial development and growth is not
uniform among the countries studied. The author hastens to add that this may reflect upon the
choice of proxies, which although standard, are by no means considered to be excellent in
capturing the speed and nature of financial development. Contrary also to expectations, the path
of financial development is not impacted in any definite pattern. Most of the countries do,
however, display a reversal in the nature of the relationship.
Some definite conclusions can be made with respect to specific countries. Overall,
financial and economic integration do not seem to have benefited Denmark, when the relationship
is studied through the financial development channel. A study of the average growth rates for
these countries over the last decade shows that Denmark is on the lower end of the spectrum of
growth rates for the OECD countries. While there is no definitive evidence that financial
integration positively impacts financial development or growth, there is no doubt that financial
development has contributed to the great growth surge experienced in Ireland and Spain over the
last decade. Interestingly Switzerland has experienced the lowest average growth rates out of the
OECD countries over the last decade, indicating that there may be some benefit to be garnered
from joining the European Union.
Financial integration and financial development have played a key role in the high
growth rates achieved by countries like Ireland and Spain. The UK seems to channel a significant
level of private credit outside of its own borders and this has lessened the impact of financial
development on its own economy. Reflecting the lack of uniform development, financial
integration and financial development do not seem to have any positive impact on Denmark,
which is on the lower end of the spectrum of growth in the EU. Overall, the results of the
analysis on financial integration seem to support the conclusion made by De Gregorio. There
does not seem to be any direct evidence of financial integration on economic growth after
controlling for financial depth.
Finally, in a surprising turn of events, the evidence shows that free banking (the lifting of
regulations on bank operations across country borders) did not have a significant impact on the
nature of the relationship for most of the countries. The overall findings in this paper support the
hypothesis that some countries are benefiting more than other as a result of financial and
economic integration. The study concludes with the conclusion of an overwhelming puzzle – the
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overall relationship between financial development and growth does not change with the advent
of free banking. Further research is needed to better understand and qualify this puzzle.
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Appendix 1
De Gregorio (1999) presents a dynamic two-country, two-agent, two-good model. The
countries are A and B, and the goods are 1 and 2. Country A produces x amount of good 1, and y
amount of good 2. Country B produces x* amount of good 1, and y* amount of good 2. In the
case where there is no specialization between the countries, country A produces x=q and y=1-q.
Country B produces x*=q and y*=1-q, where q>0.5. Therefore the assumption is that production
of each good is unitary and that country i is more efficient at good i. The two countries can
benefit from specialization through economies of scale such that if country A specializes in good
1, it can produce x=Q>1, while country B could produce y*=Q of good 2.
The household agents own the firm, and reap the dividends from the production by firms.
In period 1, consumers engage in asset trading, and production occurs. Consumer preferences are
realized in period 2, and either good (each with probability 0.5) is demanded. The utility function
for the consumption of g amount of either good is denoted as u(g).
In a closed economy setting, with specialization, country A will produce Q amount of
good 1, and very little, if any, of good 2. Normalizing the number of consumers to 1, the
expected utility function is as below:

U a = [u (Q ) + u (0)] / 2

(1)

If there is local diversification, however, the utility function will take the form of equation (2)
below:

U b = [u (q ) + u (1 − q )] / 2

(2)

De Gregorio points out that under the standard concavity of the utility function, and the existence
of scale economies, countries will not specialize and so the representative consumer’s expected
utility function will be given by equation (2).
Under the assumption of an open economy, households can diversify and hold shares in foreign
companies outside of the domestic borders. These shares are denoted s. Shares held in domestic
firms are denoted (1-s). Expected utility then takes the form below:

U c = [u ( sx + (1 − s ) x*) + u (sy + (1 − s ) y*)] / 2

(3)

De Gregorio then emphasizes two results: countries specialize to maximize production, and thus
x=Q, y*=Q, and x*=y=0. Secondly the representative consumer holds a balanced portfolio with
s=0.5. The utility function is then

U c = [u (Q / 2) + u (Q / 2)] / 2

(4)

which is greater than U a orU b . The general result is then U c > U b > U a .
The main conclusions from the model are that representative consumers can smooth consumption
across time when they can trade in international assets, and secondly the inability of consumers to
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protect themselves against risk through international asset trading leads to sub-optimal
specialization. International risk sharing then leads to a lower variance of consumption: it is

1
(q − )2 in a closed economy but 0 in an open economy. There is also a production effect that
2
increases consumption from 0.5 in a closed economy to Q/2 in the open economy. Through
calibration, De Gregorio goes on to show that countries that stand to gain most from international
risk-sharing are developing countries, and that the main reason for these large welfare gains is full
financial integration.
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Appendix 2
Table 12: Chow Tests for Structural Breaks - DCY
AUSTRIA

DENMARK

FINLAND

GREECE

IRELAND

PORTUGAL

SPAIN

SWEDEN

UK

TB

1995

1973

1989

1995

1981

1989

1973

1989

1986

1989

1986

1989

1995

1973

1989

f-stat

4.827

1.299

2.122

5.251

1.913

1.501

0.516

0.552

8.369

0.290

2.051

1.810

1.315

0.937

3.202

0.012

0.283

0.131

0.009

0.159

0.234

0.600

0.579

0.001

0.749

0.140

0.175

0.278

0.399

0.049

pvalue

Table 13: Chow Tests for Structural Breaks - PCY
AUSTRIA

DENMARK

FINLAND

GREECE

IRELAND

PORTUGAL

SPAIN

SWEDEN

UK

TB

1995

1973

1989

1995

1981

1989

1973

1989

1986

1989

1986

1989

1995

1973

1989

f-stat

3.132

1.087

2.432

11.183

3.447

5.711

0.079

0.958

2.415

0.029

1.155

1.257

3.836

1.579

2.566

0.053

0.346

0.099

0.000

0.040

0.006

0.924

0.391

0.101

0.971

0.324

0.294

0.029

0.217

0.089

pvalue
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Table 14: Chow Tests for Structural Breaks - DGDP
AUSTRIA

DENMARK

FINLAND

GREECE

IRELAND

PORTUGAL

SPAIN

SWEDEN

UK

TB

1995

1973

1989

1995

1981

1989

1973

1989

1986

1989

1986

1989

1995

1973

1989

f-stat

4.449

0.549

0.223

7.939

0.241

3.879

0.116

2.811

5.872

0.138

1.122

0.744

1.409

1.234

0.871

0.017

0.581

0.801

0.001

0.787

0.027

0.890

0.071

0.005

0.872

0.334

0.481

0.255

0.301

0.425

pvalue
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Appendix 3
Table 15: Growth Rates of Real GDP, Average Annual Growth in Percentage, 1991-2003.

Source: OECD World Factbook, 2005.
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Appendix 4 - Net flows of funds in the form of deposits and currency relative to GDP
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Appendix 4 continued.
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